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I. INTRODUCTION
A vast amount of literature shows that women are financially
disadvantaged, relative to men, in marriage.1 The objective in this
essay is to "follow the money" in stepfamilies in order to document
the financial effects of existing laws and policies in two areas:
stepparent's financial responsibilities to stepchildren and inheri-
1. See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991) (describing family
roles and how some roles are valued more than others); DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, EQUAL
COMPENSATION FOR WOMEN: A GUIDE To GETTING WHAT YOU'RE WORTH IN SALARY,
BENEFITS, AND RESPECT (1994) (explaining the legal steps women can take to demand equal
pay); JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE
POSTMODERN AGE (1996) (viewing financial obstacles for certain family members when
describing the political values of the family).
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tance in steprelationships. In other words, this essay aims to begin
a dialogue about important questions affecting stepfamily
relationships-questions such as what is going on with stepfamily
money and how these financial issues are currently addressed.
This essay also provides suggestions to effectively address the
difficult financial issues facing women. The following discussion is
not about abstract economic theory. It is about women needing and
having personal financial security in the real world.
Currently, little research specifically pertaining to remarriage
and financial issues exists and this research is limited in scope.2
However, this preliminary look at the financial position of women
offers compelling reasons why women in remarriages are becoming
increasingly financially marginalized.
This essay initially surveys the financial consequences of laws
and policies, as shown by appellate court cases and state statutes.
The survey of cases and statutes will demonstrate that there is good
reason for women to feel financially disadvantaged. In fact, some
women consider themselves disadvantaged at a high enough level
to leave their marriages, while many other women who are in
ongoing marriages struggle to address current inequalities.3
One critical area of family building that has not received much
attention is the merging of finances-if, in fact, spouses in a
stepfamily actually do merge their finances. This issue becomes
even more murky when couples cohabit instead of remarrying.
Little research has been done in the area of cohabitation and quasi-
stepfamilies, and more research is certainly needed. Notwithstand-
ing the lack of research, this essay focuses primarily on remarried
couples. To date, few social scientists have undertaken the task of
2. See, e.g., Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, Financial Management in
Stepfamilies, 10 LIFESTYLES: FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 217, 217-32 (1989); Barbara Fishman, The
Economic Behavior of Stepfamilies, 32 FAM. REL. 359, 359-66 (1982); Lingxin Hao, Family
Structure, Private Transfers, and the Economic Well-Being of Families with Children, 75 SOC.
FORCES 269, 269-92 (1996); Jean M. Lown & Elizabeth M. Dolan, Financial Challenges in
Remarriage, 9 LIFESTYLES: FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 73, 73-88 (1988); Margaret Mahoney,
Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 917-950
(1989); Lillian Messinger, Remarriage Between Divorced People with Children from Previous
Marriages: A Proposal for Preparation for Remarriage, 2 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. COUNSELING
193, 193-200 (1976); Kay Pasley et al., The Effects of Financial Management Strategies on
Quality of Family Life in Remarriage, 15 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 53, 53-70 (1994); Sarah
Ramsey & Judith M. Masson, Stepparent Support of Stepchildren: A Comparative Analysis
of Policies and Problems in the American and English Experience, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659,
659-714 (1985).
3. See Margorie Engel, Divorce, in THE ROUTELEDGE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WOMEN'S STUDIES (Tara Montgomery ed., forthcoming June 2000).
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relating intra-family financial security with the various aspects of
family law.4
The economic perils associated with the changing composition
of families have not yet been adequately studied. In general,
society does not tell women what life is really like financially.
Society provides limited economic education for women and rests
upon the general assumption that there will always be a man to
provide for a woman's needs. However, society appears to ignore
the high divorce rate in this country, the generally recognized
disproportionate custodial and financial burden that mothers
assume for children,5 the actuarial assumption that women live
longer than men, and the fact that some women do not wish to be
economically dependent upon men.
The faulty legal definition of modern marriage as being a
"marital partnership" may conceal a married woman's poverty. 6
While the rhetoric of a partnership abounds in our culture today, a
true legal partnership only exists if the husband allows it to exist.
7
Married women may assume that the rhetoric of partnership is
enough, but research shows that this assumption is wrong.8
Women cannot rely upon the spirit of generosity. By examining the
laws and policies of divorce and inheritance, as articulated by
appellate court cases and state statutes, Parts I and II of this essay
will prove that marriage is not a partnership in the eyes of the law.
How many financially vulnerable women are there nationwide?
In general, demographic, social and economic data comes from the
census, which is taken every ten years. Current information is
provisional, while "final and more detailed data are older."9 This
essay typically uses older and more detailed data because it
provides a better overall picture of stepfamily relationships in the
United States.
4. See Kay Pasley & Theodore Futris, Annotation of Recent Research Literature:
Remarriage and Stepfamilies (1995-1997), Presentation Before the Stepfamily Association
of America Professional Training Seminar (April 1998) (on file with author).
5. See Arthur J. Norton & Louisa F. Miller, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the
1990's, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS § P23-180, at 11 (1992).
6. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 683, 716 n.96 (1992). The
earliest official legal use of the phrase "marital partnership" is located in the 1963 Report of
the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the President's Commission on the Status of
Women. See id.
7. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of
Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1423 (1996).
8. See id. at 1418.
9. CYNTHIA M. TAEUBER, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK ON WOMEN IN AMERICA i (2d ed. 1996).
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Data indicates that a large percentage of our population is
remarried and is therefore in a "step" relationship. One out of
every three Americans is a stepparent, stepchild, stepsibling, or
other member of a stepfamily.' Using the 1990 census data, Sally
Clarke found that 20% of remarriages were remarriages for both
the husband and the wife," while 11% of remarriages were between
a single woman and a divorced man,12 and another 1% of remar-
riages were between a single man and a divorced woman. 3 This
leaves a small percentage to account for widows and widowers who
remarried. Put another way, approximately two-thirds of divorced
women remarry. 4 In addition, "most remarriages take place
relatively soon after divorce."' 5 To complicate a woman's financial
security even further, "redivorce is somewhat more likely than first
divorce."16 This marital cycle has a generally recognized detrimen-
tal effect on child support and on a woman's ability to create per-
sonal financial security through job continuity, retirement benefits,
and inheritance.
Because stepfamilies can no longer be considered a dramatic
departure from the nuclear family, 7 people assume that they know
all they need to know about remarriage. Generally, society does not
seem to have an awareness of the differences between first and
second marriages" or how laws and policies may be detrimental to
second marriages. The fragility of second marriages, 9 however,
may have much to do with the agony adults and children encounter,
feeling as if they may not be up to the tasks facing them in a step-
family. 20 A sampling of appellate cases and laws2' also indicates
10. See Paul C. Glick, Parents with Young Stepchildren and with Adult Stepchildren:
A Demographic Profile 16, Paper presented to the Stepfamily Association of America (Oct.
4, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Glick, A Demographic Profile]; see also Norton &
Miller, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that "more than 4 out of 10 marriages in the United States
involve a second or higher-order marriage for the bride, the groom, or both.').
11. See Sally Clarke, Advance Report of Final Marriage Statistics, 1989 and 1990,
MONTHLY VITAL STAT. REP., July 14, 1995, at 4.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 5.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. at 6.
17. See Glick, A Demographic Profile, supra note 10, at 16.
18. See Betty Carter & Monica McGoldrick, Forming a Remarried Family, in THE
CHANGING FAMILY LIFE CYCLE: A FRAMEWORK FOR FAMILY THERAPY 399, 402 (2d ed. 1989)
(discussing the fact that most people, including therapists, do not recognize the complexities
of a second marriage and therefore fail to recognize a distinction between first and second
marriages).
19. See Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 5.
20. See Carter & McGoldrick, supra note 18, at 405-06 (discussing potential emotional
issues resulting from divorce and remarriage).
21. See infra Parts II, III.
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that our laws and policies may be hostile to stepparents and
stepchildren, augmenting the differences between first and second
marriages."
Financial issues in remarriage are the cornerstone of a
woman's personal financial security. The potential magnitude of
these economic perils is extraordinarily large due to the restructur-
ing of marriage.23 Given this restructuring of marriage, and longer
life expectancies in our modern society, we can expect the number
of remarriages to increase, even if divorces decline, making the
issue very important at this time.
A. Structure of American Law Affecting Remarriage
There appears to be an enormous hole in current remarriage
laws and policies. It is almost as if society decided that the
remarriage issue is too complicated to address and, in an attempt
to ignore existing and potential problems, it set up a "zone of
privacy" around marital finances. To understand a remarried
woman's financial situation, a study of the law's role in the problem
is necessary. A preliminary look at the legal positions regarding
adult financial responsibility for both children and inheritance
indicates that the law reflects neither the psychological and
financial positions of women, nor the needs of children.24 Many
current laws were constructed at a time when women were
systematically excluded from participating in their creation.25
Without an understanding of the real world of women, updated
laws cannot reflect reality or seek viable solutions to women's
financial problems. Additionally, social science research reveals
very little about the financial world of remarried women.26
A remarried woman's financial perils may be explained by
society's insistence on keeping the private and the public spheres
separate and distinct. A philosophy of "the personal is political" is
at the core of most contemporary feminism.27 For women, the
22. See generally Carolyn R. Glick, The Spousal Share in Intestate Succession:
Stepparents Are Getting Shortchanged, 74 MINN. L. REV. 631, 631-59 (1990) [hereinafter
Glick, Stepparents Are Getting Shortchanged] (arguing that despite the adoption and revision
of the Uniform Probate Code's spousal share provision, further revision is necessary to meet
the needs of stepfamilies, a group the legal system has largely ignored).
23. See Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 1.
24. See Glick, A Demographic Profile, supra note 10, at 15.
25. See MARTHA A. FINEMAN & ISABEL KARPN, MOTHERS IN LAW 147 (1995).
26. For a useful summary of this literature, see generally Pasley & Futris, supra note 4.
27. See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 110-33 (1989)
(discussing the close relationship between the supposedly distinct public and domestic
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public and domestic spheres are in many ways not distinct or
separate realms at all. "[T]o the extent that a more private,
domestic sphere does exist, its very existence, the limits that define
it, and the types of behavior that are acceptable and not acceptable
within it all result from political decisions.""
The state may be to blame for these problems because the state
is responsible for the background rules that affect people's domestic
behaviors. After all, the legislatures and courts in individual states
determine the laws and policies regarding marriage, divorce, and
inheritance, and these laws affect women in a very real way. This
is not feminist rhetoric-it is reality. Discussions throughout this
essay will allude to the magnitude of the state's role in perpetuating
the financial perils of women in stepfamilies and will give examples
of how the state designs and reinforces financial decisions that have
a negative effect on women in remarriages.
B. Income Disparity and Directional Inferences About Causality
An analysis of the conditions and variables that yield income
disparity leads to some directional inferences about causality. At
the very beginning of a marriage, sacrifice becomes an issue
because many married women are resigned to a lack of personal
fulfillment, unless they can successfully juggle family and career.29
Social custom has assigned women to the role of the unpaid primary
care-giver in the domicile and for elderly or ill kin living
elsewhere.30 In remarriages, this unpaid care-giving role also
extends to stepchildren.3 ' Society knows that this unpaid care-
taking role falls primarily on women, but most people have not
given sufficient thought to what this responsibility means.
Nonetheless, the unpaid care-giver role affects every aspect of a
woman's life, including her personal financial security.
Taken as a whole, remarriage probably reduces some of the
stresses associated with women's economic insecurity. However,
spheres and the public/domestic distinction's impact on feminist politics and theory).
28. Id. at 129.
29. See generally ARIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFM WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989) (discussing the problems facing women who
both work and raise families).
30. See generally STEPHANIE COoNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES
AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992) (discussing research results indicating that women, in
addition to taking on the demands of their careers, are more likely than their husbands to
take on the responsibilities of housework and childcare).
31. See Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club-Examining the
Financial [In]Security of Women in Remarriages 6-7 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northeastern University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Engel, Pockets of Poverty].
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married women's economic dependence in two-parent families has
been described as, "perhaps, the most hidden dimension of inequal-
ity in contemporary society."32 Women often find themselves in
perplexing financial conditions even though family income and net
worth may be high. "Although married women have more family
resources to invest in family members, they may be just as economi-
cally dependent as non-married mothers"33 if they do not have and
maintain personal financial security.
The law fails women in the area of employment as well. For
example, in too many instances, women are still paid lower wages
than men for the same work.34 As a direct result of women's care-
taking role assignment, mothers often find themselves on a
"mommy track" for career development.3 5 In addition, the "mar-
riage tax," while neutral in wording, disproportionately affects
family decisions regarding the wife's work and the family's second
income. 6 Such inequalities work against a woman who is trying to
create her own financial security.
C. Backdrop for This Modern Dilemma
The limited body of literature that addresses the modern
financial dilemma in remarriage began in 1976.3' Thus, researchers
have considered financial issues in remarriage for only the past
twenty-three years. Even though earlier reports of finances as a
primary source of stress in families existed,3 s researchers had
previously paid little attention to this aspect of stepfamily life.
32. M. P. Atkinson et al., Measuring Wives' Material Dependence 425, 426, Paper
presented at the Theory Construction and Research Methodology Workshop, annual meeting
of the National Council on Family Relations, Orlando, Fla. (Nov. 1992) (on file with author).
33. Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at 7.
34. See BERRY, supra note 1, at xi.
35. See id. at 185.
36. See, e.g., U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE 26-27 (C.C.H. 1999). Many couples, in assessing the
value and costs associated with different sources of family income, tend to "simplify the tax
code" by viewing the first dollar of the second spouse's income, usually the wife's, as taxed
at the same rate as the last dollar of the first spouse's income, usually the husband's. While
this is not quite the way the marginal rate of tax on incremental income works, this
perception impacts the financial decisions a household makes. See generally BERRY, supra
note 1 (explaining how the tax system discourages two income marriages and thereby
encourages women to stay at home).
37. See, e.g., Messinger, supra note 2, at 193-200.
38. See, e.g., JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 23 (1972).
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1. Research on Stepfamilies and Money
Early researchers' investigations into the financial challenges
of remarriage in North America indicated that the second largest
source of difficulties in remarriage included financial problems.39
A number of years passed, however, before the recognition of
financial difficulties in remarriage led to questions about how these
families actually handled their money. Barbara Fishman addressed
such issues in The Economic Behavior of Stepfamilies.4" Fishman
identified two distinct methods for handling stepfamily finances.
The first method, called "Common Pot Stepfamilies," is a method of
pooling resources and distributing them according to need.4' The
second method, based upon an exchange theory,42 is termed "Two
Pot Stepfamilies."' This method maintains that resources are kept
separate and distribution is made to family members primarily
according to biological identity. Fishman found that the "financial
commitment to a new wife or new husband comes slowly; and still
more slowly, if at all, comes financial commitment to step-
children."" As such, couples in stepfamilies need to develop a
concept of the common good which is balanced by money manage-
ment that encourages personal autonomy.45
The discovery that remarriage economic behavior differed from
first marriage behavior quickly led to questions about how the
government assesses choices for meeting the financial needs of
various children. Sarah Ramsey and Judith Masson addressed this
topic in their journal article, Stepparent Support of Stepchildren:
A Comparative Analysis of Policies and Problems in the American
and English Experience.46 Ramsey and Masson focused on the
United States and England because "their shared common law
heritage simplifies comparison of family legal relations."47 They
discovered that "[not all countries have been as reticent as the
United States to impose a support obligation on stepparents."48 In
England, "stepparents have also been expected to support
39. See Messinger, supra note 2, at 197.
40. See Fishman, supra note 2.
41. See id. at 366.
42. The "exchange theory" used in this marital finances context presumes that a married
couple will choose the financial behavior that gives each spouse her fair share. In this
context, each married partner maintains control over personal resources.
43. See Fishman, supra note 2, at 366.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See Ramsey & Masson, supra note 2.
47. Id. at 680.
48. Id. at 663.
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stepchildren living in the home during marriage and, since 1958,
stepparents could be required to continue support after the
termination of their marriage."49 Because of the large variety of
stepfamilies,5 ° Ramsey and Masson concluded that "a general policy
of non-interference with stepfamilies would seem to be the best
approach."51
Another team of researchers observed that "[t]he marital
relationship has been complicated and family unity threatened
when pre-existing financial strains and problems were carried into
a subsequent marriage."52 They recommended "preparation for
remarriage" programs in order to help these couples manage their
financial problems.53 Shortly thereafter, another scholar explained
that remarried couples have a double burden of managing the
generic issues of family life, as well as the financial circumstances
that are unique to remarriage.5
As the number of stepfamilies increased, court cases addressing
inheritance rights began to challenge the assumptions of blood-line
inheritance.55 While individually written and properly executed
wills often produced clear directives that considered step-relation-
ships, most American intestacy laws continue not to recognize step-
relationships.56 Margaret Mahoney criticized the laws of intestate
succession and argued against any law that would base inheritance
decisions on birth status alone because modern family life is too
complex.57
The next development in the research pertaining to step-
families occurred when Kay Pasley expanded Fishman's model,58 by
putting couples into one of three financial management strategy
groups: those having only joint accounts, those having only
separate accounts, and those having a combination of joint and
49. Id.
50. For example, some stepfamilies consist of children brought into the family from both
the remarried adults. Other stepfamilies consist of children brought into the family only by
the wife or the husband. Moreover, disparate ages between adults and between children in
the combined family may cause a great deal of variation between stepfamilies, in addition
to differences caused by race, religion and culture.
51. Ramsey & Masson, supra note 2, at 714.
52. Lown & Dolan, supra note 2, at 73.
53. See id. at 85.
54. See Coleman & Ganong, supra note 2, at 217-18 (citing child support, debt from a
previous marriage, and expenses associated with merging two households as problems
unique to remarriage).
55. See, e.g., Chambers v. Warren, 657 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (interpreting a will
in favor of stepchildren and not the natural children).
56. See Mahoney, supra note 2, at 917-18.
57. See id. at 938.
58. See Fishman, supra note 2, at 359-66; see also supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
POCKETS OF POVERTY
separate accounts.5 9 The study found a variety of reasons why a
couple chooses one of these money management strategies. These
reasons include the partners' attitudes toward financial manage-
ment and decision making, a couple's ability to work out solutions
that are mutually satisfactory, the structural complexity of the
stepfamily, a couple's marital history, a couple's conflict over
finances, and their attitudes toward power and control.6 °
Finally, Lingxin Hao analyzed the distribution of family wealth
and transfers through an analysis of the family structure, including
remarriage. 6' This analysis provides useful data on the effects that
the family structure has on transfers, and their resulting impact on
family wealth.62 However, it fails to provide data about the
inheritance decision-making process that remarried couples
undertake.63
These above-mentioned studies encompass the extent of the
existing research that primarily focuses on remarriage and money
management. However, none of these works speak directly to the
wife's personal financial security. Although the apparent purpose
of each study was to gather information about the money manage-
ment in remarriage, the effect of money management styles on
family relationships was the underlying theme. Furthermore, each
study recognized the need for additional information in order to
support stepfamilies in their search for successful role models.
Therefore, although remarriage is incredibly commonplace in the
United States," gaps in the literature exist.
2. Growing Awareness of a Problem
Divorce, single parenting, living together, and remarriage are
now common stages in American life.6" As a result, people need to
reorganize their financial views of their world, especially since
changing relations between men and women create a complicated
financial picture. In the past, most women deferred to their
59. See Pasley et al., supra note 2, at 56-57, 61-62.
60. See id. at 67-68.
61. See Hao, supra note 2.
62. See id. at 279-86.
63. See id.
64. See Glick, A Demographic Profile, supra note 10, at 15-16.
65. See id.
1999] 319
320 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 5:309
husbands as the primary money managers.66 Remarriage has
altered this dynamic.
If the old rules that called for women to rear children and
men to earn and manage the finances are not working well in
first-marriage families, which they are not, they have absolutely
no chance at all in a system where some of the children are
strangers to the wife, and where the finances include sources of
income and expenditure that are not in the husband's power to
generate or control (e.g., alimony, child support, earnings of the
ex-wife or current wife).6 7
Thus, today, women who are gainfully employed and remarried may
be more likely to make financial decisions for themselves and their
children-a phenomenon which is accentuated in remarriage.
D. Conceptual Framework
The following sections review the financial experiences of
wives. Part II analyzes stepparents' financial responsibilities for
stepchildren. This research focuses upon existing laws and policies,
as well as their implications for the stepparent, the biological
parent, and the stepchild's financial security. It gives an overview
of current policy and statutory law, discusses the doctrines of in
loco parentis and equitable estoppel, and examines express oral and
written agreements to support stepchildren. This essay then
discusses case law related to AFDC benefits and its connection to
stepparent financial liability.68
66. See generally ViInANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 36-69 (1994)
(describing the historical role of men as money managers and how this role has changed over
time).
67. Carter & McGoldrick, supra note 18, at 400.
68. Within the AFDC federal guidelines, welfare officials are required to "deem" a portion
of the residential stepparent's income to be available for stepchild support. This stepparent
support is taken into consideration when the welfare officials compute the child's level of
need for AFDC assistance-even if the funds are not actually provided by the stepparent.
The government reformed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC),
by replacing it with a state block grant program called Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF). See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-673
(West Supp. 1998) (replacing Aid to Families with Dependant Children with a program of
block grants to the states for the purpose of giving the states greater flexibility). Sample
appellate cases will show that having to submit to the various federal assistance programs'
demands adversely affected some families. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Dep't of Welfare, 485 A.2d 896
(Pa. Comm. 1985) (describing a situation wherein the custodial mother's remarriage ended
her daughter's AFDC benefits). See also infra notes 185-94.
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Because couples within peak childbearing and rearing years
form many new stepfamilies, this essay next considers case law
regarding the support of stepchildren and biological children from
prior and current unions.69 Although many cases deal with
stepparents married to custodial parents, this essay also reviews
the financial position of a stepparent who is married to a
noncustodial parent.70 This essay then presents several different
proposals for change which have been advanced by legal, therapeu-
tic, and academic professionals who work with and/or study
families.71
Part III discusses the impact that inheritance laws have on
subsequent wives. This essay argues that the partnership theory
of marriage cannot fully develop when existing laws and policies
create artificial restrictions. 2 This essay then discusses the need
to remove such restrictions. Anecdotal evidence shows that
inheritance issues cause discomfort for many stepfamilies and the
common response may be to do nothing. However, this essay
argues that the consequences of doing nothing surface as probate
and intestacy problems.73 Moreover, this essay suggests that the
issue of relatedness is central to the confusion that surrounds the
connections between stepparent and stepchild.74  In addition,
observations that professionals who work with and/or study
families will be discussed.75
As this essay will show in Parts II and III, it is clear that legal
decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. This case-by-case
formula provides no foundation for laws that will protect the
personal financial security of second wives. As a result, the
contemporary legal system still affords remarried women little or
no control over many aspects of their financial lives. Parts IV and
V of this essay will discuss the policy considerations behind
women's needs for financial security, as well as recommendations
and proposals for the future.
69. See infra notes 113-96 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 205-37 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 260-352 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 353-427 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 428-36 and accompanying text.
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II. STEPPARENTS AND STEPCHILDREN: FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW
Confusion about stepparent financial responsibility for
stepchildren permeates American society. From political institu-
tions, to legal codes, to the actions and attitudes of individual
family members, questions abound with regard to the appropriate
and necessary role a stepparent should play in the fiscal support of
a stepchild. Most people do not have an accurate view of the
obligations family law imposes, and most people pay little attention
to the law as they form their relationships. 6
At the same time, American law has no comprehensive
definition of the stepfamily. The American Bar Association's Model
Act Establishing Rights and Duties of Stepparents 77 and the United
States Census Bureau provide two examples. The American Bar
Association tentatively defines stepparent as "a person who is
married to the person who ... has custody of a minor child."78 The
Census Bureau, however, defines stepfamily as a "'married-couple
family' with at least one stepchild of the householder present,
where the householder is the husband."79  How odd it is to use
custody as the differentiator when society emphasizes a continued
connection between a child and both of the biological parents, not
only for minors, but for adult children as well. Adding to this
confusion, researchers have found that the relationships between
stepparents and their stepchildren vary widely from one family to
the next, particularly relating to the degree of economic and
custodial responsibility assumed by the stepparent.80
76. See David Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of
"Family"After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORMATTHE CROSSROADS 102,102 (Stephen Sugarman
& Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
77. See MODEL ACT ESTABLISHING RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STEPPARENTS § 1A (tentative
draft for discussion purposes 1990), reprinted in Joel D. Tenenbaum, Legislation for
Stepfamilies: The Family Law Section Standing Committee Report, 25 FAM. L.Q. 137, 140
(1991).
78. Id. In 1987, the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association began work on
the Model Act Establishing Rights and Duties of Stepparents but the resolution has been
tabled while awaiting more input. See id. at 138. Even with the increased focus on visitation
rights and joint custody, the ABA has not yet recognized the stepparent status of the spouse
of a non-custodial parent. See id. at 137-41. This is a major oversight.
79. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population & Housing-CPH-4, Appendix
B: Definitions of Subject Characteristics (1990), at B-5 (last modified 1996)
<http://www.census.gov/prod/1/90dec/cph4/appdxb.pdf>.
80. See generally Judith Zucker Anderson & Geoffry D. White, An Empirical
Investigation of Interaction and Relationship Patterns in Functional and Dysfunctional
Nuclear Families and Stepfamilies, 25 FAM. PROCESS 407 (1986).
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What appears on the surface to be a lack of connection between
stepfamilies and the legal system is more likely derived from
assumptions regarding the social structure. It seems that many of
the stepfamily financial difficulties result from structural issues
relating to the institutions of marriage and the family. Indeed, the
bias against stepfamilies has worked its way into laws and policies.
Thus, the results, not surprisingly, confirm and reinforce existing
biases. Family courts have been slow to accommodate people tradi-
tionally defined as outsiders, such as stepparents or stepchildren."1
As a result, the economic perils associated with the changing
composition of families have not been adequately considered. 2
Some consensus does exist that marriage improves a woman's
material well-being-at least to the extent of her husband's
largesse within the marriage. This common consensus, however,
does not consider whether remarriage improves the material well-
being of stepchildren. Instead, it appears to have been taken for
granted that some members of a family household cannot be rich
while others are poor. However, "little is known about the flows of
resources within households and what is known does not support
the idea of intra-household equality." 4 Therefore, assumptions
about the equal or equitable distribution of income within
stepfamilies are inevitably misguided and misleading.
Stepparents are already an important financial resource for
children 5 and more than one-half of today's young people in the
United States will likely become stepsons or stepdaughters by the
year 2000.86 With so many people involved, it seems likely that the
states and the federal government will need to develop new and
specific policies related to stepfamilies.
Courts have had difficulty accepting the possibility that it
might be in the child's best interests to have two legal fathers.8 7
Due to high divorce rates, unwed parenthood, couples living
together without the benefit of a legal document, and remarriages,
it appears that all Americans are called upon to help rear each
81. See Barbara Shapiro, 'Non-Traditonal" Famnilies in the Courts: The New Extended
Family, 11 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 117, 118 (1993).
82. See generally Katharine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879
(1984) (criticizing the legal system's treatment of the nuclear family as an exclusive unit,
when, in modern society, many children live in non-traditional family settings).
83. See Atkinson et al., supra note 32, at 426.
84. Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at 32.
85. See Bartlett, supra note 82, at 881.
86. See Paul C. Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfamilies, and Stepchildren: A Brief
Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24, 26 (1989) [hereinafter Glick, Remarried Families].
87. See Shapiro, supra note 81, at 118.
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other's children. Now may be the time to consider the value of
legally recognizing the fact that many children have more than two
parents. The legal community might serve family values better if
it recognizes that a child can, and often does, have two or more
"mothers" and two or more "fathers."
With respect to the financial responsibility for children, no
uniform treatment of the stepparent-child relationship exists
among the states.88 Marriage to a child's parent would seem to
create a legal relationship, but, this "step" relationship does not
create rights and obligations between the parties and children. 9 If
this interpretation is correct, the illusion itself undoubtedly creates
household friction. It would seem reasonable that the lack of clear
legal obligations, rights, and privileges between stepparents and
stepchildren would lessen their degree of commitment to each
other, would weaken the marital bond, and would encourage the
remarriage to fail.
Children look to parents for emotional care, food, and financial
support.90 This parent is often a stepparent, and not a biological
parent, yet courts are inconsistent about whether child support
should be required in stepfamily relationships where a stepchild
has developed a psychological or emotional bond-a parent-child
relationship-with the stepparent.9 1
The lack of legal recognition of these relationships may affect
the stability and the individual sense of satisfaction within such
relationships. For instance, legally married couples may be more
likely to stay together because of the legal relationship than couples
who are merely living together. In addition, a legal relationship
with a child may create a stronger sense of responsibility to that
child. Among other things, recognition of a legal relationship
between the stepparent and the stepchild could open the way for a
form of stepparent adoption of a stepchild, without the loss of the
biological parent's rights or the loss of the child's inheritance rights
from the biological parent. An adoption or inheritance of this type
would recognize that biology is not the sole determining factor of
whether someone is a parent.
88. See generally MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW (1994)
[hereinafter STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW] (summarizing the different legal issues across the
country which affect the stepparent-stepchild relationship).
89. See Bernard Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step"Relationship: Cinderella
Revisited, 4 FAM. L.Q. 209, 210 (1970).
90. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 387-90 (1994).
91. See Paul J. Buser, Introduction: The First Generation of Stepchildren, 25 FAM. L.Q.
1, 8-9 (1991).
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It is commonly recognized that, in divorce by parental choice or
by court order, courts award custody of children to mothers more
often than fathers. s2 Therefore, it is typically a custodial mother
who forms a new family with a new husband and children from a
prior relationship."3 The question then arises whether this change
in the child's circumstances should be viewed as creating a child
support obligation from the stepfather to the stepchild. Thus, this
essay focuses on whether stepparents are legally obligated to
support stepchildren.
A. Statutory Law: State Law of General Applicability
In this usage, "general applicability" refers to a stepparent's
obligation to support stepchildren in a manner similar to a biologi-
cal parent's obligation to support biological children; that is to say,
support obligations of the stepparent and the biological parent
would be coextensive. Some states include the residential steppar-
ent as a source of support in specified situations.94 Some states
may even impose criminal penalties upon stepparents who do not
fulfill the statutory duty of supporting their stepchildren.95 Where
states have a statute providing that a stepparent has a financial
responsibility to support a stepchild, it appears to be a codification
of the in loco parentis doctrine.96 Nevertheless, most stepchildren
92. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 98-114 (1992) (describing an empirical study of divorce and
custody).
93. See HARRY KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 846 (1998)
(citing U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1995, at 64).
94. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (Michie 1998) (imposing a financial obligation on the
stepparent when there is an oral or written agreement to do so); IOWA CODE §§ 252A.2,
252B.1 (Supp. 1997) (defining a child as including a stepchild); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.310
(Michie 1995) (requiring any stepparent applying for public assistance to support a stepchild);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.400 (West 1997) (requiring a stepparent to support a stepchild when
living in the same home); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-2 (West 1998) (defining parent as including
a stepparent); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 101 (Consol. 1998) (imposing liability on stepparents
for their stepchildren); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.053 (1997) (imposing educational expenses on
stepparents).
95. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.25.160 (Michie 1998) (imposing criminal penalties upon
stepparents when they avoid a legal responsibility to support a stepchild).
96. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 505 (1993) (mandating a duty to support a stepchild by
either marriage or cohabitation); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 577-4 (Michie 1997) (stating that
a stepparent acting in loco parentis is obligated to provide for the child if the child is in need);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (1997) (imposing responsibilities of parenting upon stepparents
when stepparents stand in the place of biological parents); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8
(Michie 1985) (stating that a stepparent is responsible for stepchildren in the same fashion
as a natural parent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1998) (stating that a stepparent shall
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cannot legally claim support from their residential stepparents
because "[flew states have enacted statutes to enforce child support
obligations on stepparents during their remarriages [to the child's
biological parent] .97
Exceptions to the aforementioned responsibilities are possible.
For instance, in Massachusetts, stepparents are "not held responsi-
ble for anything"98 unless they adopt their stepchildren. However,
custodial stepparents may have a financial responsibility if the
stepchild thought the stepfather was the natural father. 99 Thus,
the law regarding stepparent financial responsibility to
stepchildren varies from state to state and over time. Professor
Mahoney points out that "an important generalization can be made
about the current treatment of stepfamilies in the law. For the
most part, the stepparent-child relationship is not regarded as a
legal status."'
B. Current Federal Policy
As with other family matters, such as marriage, divorce,
adoption, and inheritance, the federal government has primarily
left the responsibility of implementing child support obligations to
the states. While laws governing personal relationships come from
the states, federal law presides over a wide range of programs and
policies that impact the lives of most Americans, including step-
families.101
Because states make differing family laws, federal policy-
makers cannot rely on state legislatures to pursue a single clear
direction regarding the rights and obligations of stepparents. For
a transient population, this phenomenon creates difficulties-it is
not easy for family members to always have a clear idea of their
rights and responsibilities. Regardless, "[tihe federal government
has already taken the lead, in support acts of 1984 and 1988, in
making parents (usually divorced or unwed) more accountable for
support a stepchild to the same extent as a biological parent); cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
787 (6th ed. 1990) (defining in loco parentis); infra note 113.
97. David Fine & Mark Fine, Learning from Social Sciences: A Model for Reformation
of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 DiCK. L. REV. 49, 50 (1992).
98. Telephone Interview with Laura Kersner & Sharon Blocker, Attorneys in the
Litigation Department of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Child Support
Enforcement Division (Feb. 11, 1997).
99. See id.
100. STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 232.
101. See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text (describing how the requirements of
AFDC, and its successor TANF, affect the economic stability of stepfamilies).
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the support of their children.""0 2 Thus, federal benefit programs are
"the most far-reaching aspect of the federal treatment of
stepfamilies." °3 As the provider of benefits through such programs
as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and its
successor TANF, the federal government appears to set eligibility
standards that affect the economic well-being of many children and
may overwrite state laws in the process.
Nevertheless, the federal government is inconsistent in its
approach to the stepparent-stepchild relationship. For instance,
federal programs define stepchildren differently from program to
program and treat stepchildren differently from other children.104
Consider the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of step-
relatives. The Code points out that "[in computing taxable income,
. . . 'dependent' [is defined] to potentially include stepchildren,
stepparents, and stepsiblings." °5 Also, the Code provides that a
stepchild may enable a taxpayer to qualify as a "Head of House-
hold."0 6 Finally, "[u]nder the rules for the Earned Income Tax
Credit, "child" is defined to include stepchildren, provided that the
stepparent's residence is the stepchild's principle place of abode."'0 7
Nevertheless, "[n]either the term stepparent nor the term
stepchild is defined anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code or
Treasury regulations."' Without defining a stepparent or a
stepchild, the Internal Revenue Code is bound to reveal inconsisten-
cies in the income tax treatment of the step-relationship. To accord
stepparents uniformity in their legal obligations to their step-
children, consistent federal income tax recognition of the stepfamily
is necessary.
Besides inconsistencies within the Internal Revenue Code,
federal law is also inconsistent with respect to student loans.
102. Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal Legislation
in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445, 450 & n.30 (1994) (citing the Child Support
Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 96 Stat. 1305 (1984) and the Family
Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988)).
103. Id. at 451.
104. See id. at 452.
105. Id. at 464 & n.103 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.152 (1995)).
The taxpayer must show that (1) the dependent is a close relative.., or that
he lived the entire year with the taxpayer; (2) the taxpayer provided more than
50 percent of his support; and (3) the dependent had less than $2,450 of gross
income (unless the child is less than nineteen years-old or is under twenty-four
years-old and a full-time student).
Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.152-1 (1995)).
106. See id. at 464.
107. Id.
108. Usha R. Smerdon, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of the Stepparent-Stepchild
Relationship: Part 1, 10 AM. J. FAM. L. 209, 210 (1996).
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College-bound stepchildren meet a roadblock in the first phase of
application for financial aid. When applying for financial aid, all
schools of higher education require applicants to complete a copy of
the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).' °9 This form
defines "family" as the student's custodial unit, the parent with
whom the child lived the most for the past twelve months, 110 and
this custodial unit includes stepparents. As a result, the FAFSA
requires financial information from both the custodial parent and
the stepparent."' "If the loan program can in any way characterize
the student as a family dependent, it will look to the resources of
other family members .in calculating eligibility for and terms of the
loan.""' Without a stepparent's legal obligation, which is currently
lacking, this resource is really an illusion and makes needy
stepchildren dependent upon the voluntary contributions of their
stepparents.
C. In Loco Parentis
The legal phrase in loco parentis means literally "[ii n the place
of the parent."113 In general, this relationship can apply to custodial
relationships, such as between a university and its students. For
the most part, the concept of in loco parentis arises during divorce
proceedings between the biological parent and the steppar-
ent-when the divorcing couple is debating financial support.
114
Almost one-half of the children who live through their mother's first
divorce are likely to experience the dissolution of their mother's
second marriage as well. ' 15 At issue is whether or not the stepfa-
ther has a financial support obligation to his stepchild[ren].
However, in family law usage, in loco parentis implies both
109. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,
FREE APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL STUDENT AID (1998).
110. See id. at § F.
111. See Margorie Engel, Steps Ahead with Daisy Petals: They Love Me, College
Expenses, Address at the 12th Annual Stepfamily Conference (July 20, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Engel, College Expenses].
112. Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing,
95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 311 (1992-93).
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 96, at 787.
114. See generally Paul Glick & Sung-Ling Lin, Remarriage After Divorce: Recent
Changes and Demographic Variations, 30 SOC. PERSP. 162, 162-79 (1987) (noting that the
United States Bureau of the Census publications from the decennial censuses and the
Bureau's Current Population Survey reports are leading sources of recurring information
about the demographics of divorce and remarriage).
115. See Larry L. Bumpass, Children and Marital Disruption: A Replication and Update,
21 DEMOGRAPHY 71, 80 (1984); see also Glick, A Demographic Profile, supra note 10, at 2
(explaining how the numbers of remarried families and stepchildren are determined).
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custodial and financial responsibility-literally taking on the
primary responsibilities of the absent parent.1 6
The in loco parentis doctrine does not adequately meet the
needs of the modern stepfamily. Even when the stepparent intends
to take the place of the missing noncustodial parent, the stepparent
can voluntarily terminate the relationship." ' "Ordinarily, any in
loco parentis relationship that existed during the marriage is seen
as ending at divorce." ' 8
Courts seem "reluctant to declare the existence of an in loco
parentis relationship because they fear such determinations will
dissuade stepparents from developing close relationships with their
stepchildren."" 9 However, when a stepparent and stepchild live in
the same home, declaring an intention not to stand in loco parentis
could create tense household relationships and do little to support
a sense of "family."2 °  Nonetheless, by agreeing-expressly or
implicitly-to care for, raise, and educate a stepchild, it is possible
for a stepparent to become financially and legally responsible for
that stepchild.' 2 ' In addition, noncustodial fathers' refusals to
provide any support for their children have led several states to
require that residential stepparents provide support under the
principle of in loco parentis, regardless of their agreement to do
so. 22 For example, in Mears v. Mears,'23 the Iowa Supreme Court
held that the
duty [of the stepfather] to support his wife's children while [they
were] in his home should be limited to the extent their being in
his home may have increased the cost of their maintenance by
reason of a higher living scale than that experienced during the
marriage of their mother and father.'
116. See text accompanying supra note 97.
117. See Ramsey & Masson, supra note 2, at 673.
118. Fine & Fine, supra note 97, at 52. See generally Portuondo v. Portuondo, 570 So. 2d
1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the in loco parentis relationship and support
obligation end at divorce); Amadeo v. Amadeo, 166 A.2d 397 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1960)
(same).
119. Fine & Fine, supra note 97, at 52 & n.17 (referring to In re Marriage of Holcomb, 471




123. 213 N.w.2d 511 (Iowa 1973).
124. Id. at 518.
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The primary criterion courts have used to find an in loco
parentis relationship is financial support. 2 ' Courts have also
recognized other narrow exceptions when finding an in loco parentis
relationship. In Gustin v. Gustin,26 the Ohio Court of Appeals
reasoned that when "a man marries a woman whom he knows is
pregnant by another man, he will be compelled to continue to
support the child after his marriage is dissolved."'27 In Clevenger
v. Clevenger,12 a California court held that if a stepfather accepted
a child, conceived by his wife and another man during the marriage,
as his own and acted as the ahild's father, then he would be
obligated to the child if he represented to the child that he was the
father. 29 Therefore, a stepfather could not subsequently assert the
child's illegitimacy.in order to avoid support obligations.
Finally, some courts consider more than money when finding
an in loco parentis relationship. 30 The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland upheld an award of use and possession of the family
home to the wife for a three-year period following a nine-month
temporary alimony award. 3' The reasoning behind the court's
decision was that the wife had custody of a minor child who needed
to live in a home-even though the child was a stepchild of her
husband.132  This judicial decision is unusual because courts
generally rule that stepparents have no financial responsibility
after a divorce for a stepchild, to the point that a custodial parent's
child-related expenses are not even considered in setting an
alimony amount.'33
D. Equitable Estoppel
Judges apply the equitable estoppel doctrine in order to avoid
unfair results when one individual has relied, to her detriment,
125. See Fine & Fine, supra note 97, at 52 n.17; see also Loomis v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820,
823 (1964) (holding that a stepmother's provision of financial support could be a basis for the
finding of an in loco parentis relationship).
126. 161 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
127. Michael Markoff, Stepfamily Law: Review and Proposals for Change, 18 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 701, 708 (1984); see also Gustin v. Gustin, 161 N.E.2d 68, 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
128. 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
129. See id. at 714.
130. See Strawhorn v. Strawhorn, 435 A.2d 466, 470 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, Strawhorn v. Strawhorn, 450 A.2d 665 (Md. 1982).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Laura Morgan, The Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities of Stepparents to Their
Stepchildren, 8 DIVORcE LrrG. 165, 171 (1996).
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upon the words or actions of another. 1" This doctrine requires
proof of the stepparent's assumption of parental responsibility,
reliance on the representations by the biological parent, and
resulting detriment to the parent or child."5 The third element,
detriment, is the stumbling block for stepchildren.3 3 The parent
and stepchild may be unable to prove that the stepparent's role,
even after years of altered financial and emotional aspects of their
lives, had a detrimental effect on the stepchild.
137
Many types of financial reliance exist in a stepfamily which
cause financial detriment. For instance, custodial mothers may
forgo career opportunities in order to make other contributions to
the new family. This decision, made because of the stepparent's
representations about present and future support, will most likely
affect the economic welfare of the stepchild following divorce.
Nonetheless, financial detriment has been narrowly defined to
mean permanent lost access to the financial resources of the
noncustodial parent' 3S-the mother's first husband and the father
of the child, resulting from the stepparent's, the mother's new
husband and the stepfather to her child's, conduct.
Ross V. ROSS 13 9 established-a basis for equitable estoppel in New
Jersey. In Ross, the husband and wife married eighteen months
after the birth of the wife's child. 4 Throughout his parents' four
year marriage, the child believed that Mr. Ross was his father.'4 '
In addition, the mother considered Mr. Ross her son's father
because he filed a certification of admission of paternity and treated
the child as his own.'42 The court enforced the continuing obligation
of support and prevented the husband from denying his paternity
in order to avoid "irreparable harm" to the child.
43
The Michigan courts have also upheld the doctrine of equitable
estoppel in this context. Recognizing that reasonable women form
reasonable expectations about future support, the Michigan Court
of Appeals determined that the stepfather's conduct caused
financial detriment because "[the stepfather] should have been
134. See id.
135. See Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d. 331, 358 (N.J. 1984).
136. See Morgan, supra note 133, at 172.
137. See id. at 173.
138. See id.
139. 314 A.2d 623 (N.J. Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct. 1973), affd, 342 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975).
140. See id. at 624.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 626.
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cognizant of the fact that he reduced the chances that either the
natural father or mother of the child would begin a proceeding
whereby the natural father's paternity could be established."' 4
However, in Miller v. Miller,145 the New Jersey Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether a
stepfather prevented the biological father from supporting his child,
thus requiring the stepfather to provide support. 146 Despite the
willingness of the court to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
the court cautioned against the widespread use of the doctrine so as
not to discourage stepparents from supporting stepchildren during
the marriage. 14 Thus, the narrow definition of financial detriment
found in the estoppel doctrine can result in fewer successful claims.
In addition, in Knill v. Knill,14s the fact that the stepfather's role
foreclosed the past participation by the father did not necessarily
satisfy the detriment requirement.
49
Another example of the narrow interpretation of the detriment
requirement is evidenced by Ulrich v. Cornell.50 Upon marriage to
the stepfather, the custodial mother dropped a paternity action
against the noncustodial, biological father and began a lawsuit to
terminate the biological father's parental rights.'5 ' At the same
time, the stepfather initiated an adoption proceeding that was
never finalized due to financial problems.'52 When the Ulrich
marriage ended seven years later, the stepfather was awarded
primary custody of his stepson.153 The mother appealed, and fifteen
months after the divorce, she was awarded primary custody of her
child and simultaneously requested child support from the stepfa-
ther. 5 4 The trial court and intermediate appellate court deter-
mined that, due to the stepfather's conduct, he was equitably
estopped from denying responsibility for the stepchild.'55 The
144. Nygard v. Nygard, 401 N.W.2d 323, 326 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
145. 478 A.2d 331, 359 (N.J. 1984).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. 510 A.2d 546 (Md. 1986) (rejecting the equitable estoppel theory as a basis for
ordering support from a stepfather who had resided with and supported his stepson for
sixteen years). Additionally, the court stated that, "[wie believe that [the stepfather] should
not be penalized for his conduct." Id. at 552. This court ruled in such a way even though the
child was born during the marriage and believed that the stepfather was his biological father.
See id.
149. See id.
150. 484 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1992).
151. See id. at 546.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 547.
155. See id.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, stating that "[tihe facts simply
do not give rise to an unequivocal representation of intent to
support the child, reliance on the representation by the natural
parent or detriment ... as a result of reliance." 5 '
A Utah court reached a similar result in Wiese v. Wiese.157
When Carl and Christine Wiese married, Christine was pregnant
with a son fathered by her previous husband. 5 ' Although conceived
out of wedlock by another man, the court found that the child was
"issue of the marriage"159 with the second husband. The court held
this way because the second husband signed the birth certificate as
"father" and several years later agreed to let the divorce decree
name him as the "father."' Subsequently, the divorce court
awarded the "father" custody.' 6 ' At a future date, when the "father"
was away for military training (having left the child with the
"father's" parents), the mother demanded the return of her child.
The "father" complied, and the mother assumed custody. 6 s When
she petitioned the "father" for child support, the trial court found
that the "father" was not the biological father but held that his prior
actions equitably estopped him from denying financial liability for
the child. 16
3
The Utah Supreme Court overruled the trial court's decision
because the "[the mother] had not shown that [the father's] actions
had destroyed the possibility of obtaining support from the natural
father."6 4 Unspoken is the reality that while the trial court's and
the state supreme court's due process takes place, the child is
growing up with daily financial needs for housing, food, and
clothing which, by default, have become the sole financial responsi-
bility of the mother.
Thus, the equitable estoppel doctrine has accomplished little to
change the traditional assumptions that biological parents are
solely responsible for their children's support. There is "little
reason for a change in this rule, to the extent that the supporting
and custodial parents each contribute their appropriate share of the
156. Id. at 549.
157. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
158. See id. at 701.
159. Id. (quoting the plaintiff husband's decree of divorce).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 704-05.
162. See id. at 701.
163. See id. at 702.
164. Alexander H. Walker, III, Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Stepparents-The
Utah Supreme Court Toppled by Estoppel, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 305, 306 n.7 (1987) (emphasis
added).
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cost of raising the child."'65 Requiring proof that the stepparent's
conduct permanently eliminated the noncustodial parent as .a
source of future support has drastically limited the number, of
successful support claims. This phenomenon reaffirms two
compelling features of stepchild support law: "First, the duty of the
natural parent is immutable; and second, the courts are extremely
reluctant to impose financial responsibility upon unwilling steppar-
ents."'6 6
E. Express Oral or Written Agreements to Support a Stepchild
Stipulations, agreements and contracts are all legally binding,
but different jurisdictions interpret these agreements in different
ways. In Dewey v. Dewey,'67 the Alaska Supreme Court determined
that when a stepfather agrees to support a stepchild in a dissolu-
tion decree, a court may relieve him from the judgment for such
reasons as "fraud, mistake, or . . . [another] valid reason for
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment," 6 ' thereby
undermining the stability of a legally binding decree.
Maryland courts have followed the same premise of relieving
a stepparent from a contractual obligation to support a stepchild,
even when the stepparent entered into an agreement that was
incorporated into the divorce decree.'69 The case of Brown v. Brown
turned on inconsistent definitions for familial relationships. 7 ' Mr.
Brown was sentenced to 179 days in jail for failure to pay child
support under the divorce decree, and he appealed. 17 1 The court of
appeals determined that under the Maryland Constitution, which
prohibits imprisonment for debt, but not for a failure to support a
dependent child, 172 a stepchild was not a "dependent child." The
court held that unlike a dependent child, "the legal duty to support
does not ordinarily encompass a stepchild,"'73 and thus Mr. Brown
could not be punished under the Maryland Constitution.
165. James B. Boskey, The Swamps of Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-Child
Relationship, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 829 (1995).
166. STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 38.
167. 886 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1995).
168. Id. at 626.
169. See Brown v. Brown, 412 A.2d 396 (Md. 1980).
170. See id. at 396.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 397-98; see also MD. CODE ANN., CONST. Art. III, § 38 (1981).
173. Brown, 412 A.2d at 402.
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The Mendoza 74 case, however, is one of the few in which the
court entertained the concept of two fathers for a child. In 1992,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a natural father was
obligated to pay child support, despite another man's written
acknowledgement of paternity.'75
F. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
AFDC provided supplemental income to children whose parents
were unable to support them.'76 In recent years, the federal
government required states to comply with the federal regulations,
in order to receive the financial benefits of participating in the
AFDC program.'77
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996178 (PRWORA or the "Act") dramatically altered
government support systems for American families. The Act ended
the states' entitlements to AFDC and replaced it with block grants
to the states through a program called Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF).179  Essentially, the TANF program
maintains that the federal government no longer guarantees a cash
assistance safety net for children.8" An immediate consequence of
the block grants has been the proliferation of state-sponsored
studies and research programs which address the problems of teen,
unwed, divorced and otherwise missing fathers in this country.'8 '
This switch from AFDC to block grants shifts the major
responsibility for helping poor families from the federal government
to state and local governments, 182 creating even greater confusion
in the arena of stepfamily financial responsibilities. While nothing
is inherently wrong with allowing an individual state to handle
174. State v. Mendoza, 481 N.W.2d 165 (Neb. 1992).
175. See id. at 170-74.
176. See Aid to Families with Dependant Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-673 (1995). Congress
recently overhauled the AFDC program and replaced it with Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-637 (Supp. 1998), which provides for federal block grants and
shifts control of the welfare program to the states.
177. See Aid to Families with Dependant Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-673 (1995).
178. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
179. See id. at 2110.
180. See id. at 2113.
181. For example, the Governor's Advisory Commission on Responsible Fatherhood and
Family Support in Massachusetts convened to focus the attention of government and
community leaders on father absence. This Commission developed Guiding Principles and
explored responsible fatherhood and the needs of families and children. See GOVERNOR'S
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY SUPPORT, DADS MAKE A
DIFFERENCE: ACTION FOR RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD 6-7 (1998).
182. See id.
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TANF funds as it sees fit, different laws and policies create havoc
for families moving from state to state.
183
G. Yours, Mine, and Ours: Support of Biological Children and
Stepchildren
A stepfather will likely be in the position of supporting both
biological children and stepchildren. 8 4 This phenomenon seems
most likely to happen if the stepchildren do not receive adequate
support payments from the non-custodial parent. Some scholars
believe it is only common sense for a parent to give priority to the
children with whom she lives, regardless of whether they are
biological children or stepchildren. 8 5 However, stretching dollars
to pay for a new family might result in lower payments for children
of a former family.
8 6
Noncustodial parents have often made unilateral decisions to
"reduce their own child support obligations on the basis of the
stepparent's duty to support the same child."8 7 Subsequently,
several statutes expressly mandate that the responsibilities of the
biological parents will continue despite the monetary aid coming
from stepparents.'88 In Iowa, in Mears v. Mears, s9 the biological
parents retained total responsibility for the child support based, in
part, upon "the standard of living experienced by the children
before their mother's remarriage. " "O On the other hand, the Idaho
Supreme Court reversed a trial court's ruling that had denied a
woman's request for increased child support from her ex-
husband.' 9 ' The court held that the trial court "erred in considering
as paramount the needs of the husband's second family over those
of his first family."'92 Similarly, the Superior Court of New Jersey
183. See, e.g., Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at 175-79.
184. See Sarah Ramsey, Stepparent Support of Stepchildren: The Changing Legal Context
and the Need for Emperical Policy Research, 35 FAM. REL..363, 364 (1986).
185. See Michael R. Redman, The Support of Children in Blended Families: A Call for
Change, 25 FAM. L.Q. 83, 85 (1991).
186. See generally Mary-Lynne Fisher, Stepparent Responsibility for Child Support in
California's Community Property System, 22 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 73 (1988) (discussing the
consequences of a custodial parent's expectation of improved financial status upon
remarriage of herself or her ex-spouse).
187. STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 41.
188. See id. (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.400 (West 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09
(Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.053 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-7-8 (Michie 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-4.1, -4.2 (1992)).
189. 213 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1973).
190. Id. at 519.
191. See Lewis v. Lewis, 248 P.2d 1061, 1061 (Idaho 1952).
192. Id.
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held that an increase in a father's required child support payments
was justified even though he was supporting a second wife and
child. 9 ' In another example, the natural father could not reduce
his child support obligations because of his remarriage expenses,
even though the mother's new husband's income was equivalent to
the father's.'94
. Conversely, some states determined that modification of child
support was appropriate. The California District Court of Appeal
held that a wife "by her second marriage ha[d] profited financially
while [her husband's] remarriage ha[d] added considerable extra
expenses."' The divorced father was thus granted a downward
modification on the grounds of his depleted income.'96
H. Stepparent Married to the Noncustodial Parent
Most cases pertaining to the issue of a stepparent married to
a noncustodial parent arise in community property states. Perhaps
these couples are more knowledgeable about, or more protective of,
their financial status than their counterparts in equitable distribu-
tion domiciles. In the cases reviewed in this section, the courts
were "kind" to stepparents and left financial care of the stepchild to
chance. 19
7
In a 1981 case, the Washington Supreme Court held that a
stepparent married to the noncustodial parent had no duty to
support the stepchildren. 9 s In Van Dyke v. Thompson,99 "the court
considered the support of a child in one's home as a community
obligation and the support of a child by a parent without custody as
a separate obligation that should not affect the earnings of the
stepparent," °° thereby eliminating their support obligation to the
stepchildren.
Similarly, in Berger v. Berger,2°' the Wisconsin Supreme Court
evaluated stepparent child support liability in a marital property
193. See Testut v. Testut, 111 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1955).
194. See Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 640 P.2d 202 (Ariz. App. 1981).
195. Cagwin v. Cagwin, 245 P.2d 379, 379 (Cal. App. 1952).
196. See id. at 380.
197. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Thompson, 630 P.2d 420 (Wash. 1981) (refusing to impose a
financial responsibility on a stepparent).
198. See id. at 420.
199. 630 P.2d 420.
200. Janet Mary Riley, Stepparents'Responsibility of Support, 44 LA. L. REV. 1753, 1770
(July 1994).
201. 424 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Wis. 1988).
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context. °2 This court determined that "a trial court was not to
consider a remarried ex-spouse's one-half interest in the marital
income" 10 3 computation. "Though not explicitly stated, the court's
rationale appears to be based on a desire to encourage remarriage
by exempting new spouses from pre-marriage child-support
obligations."20 ' Thus, biological parents, not stepparents, remain
responsible for their children's support in Wisconsin.
I. Proposals for Change
Despite the two aforementioned cases, the trend indicates that
the responsibility for child support will be extended to include
custodial households.0 5 While the general trend is toward the
extension of responsibility, it is interesting to note that no new
creative solutions appear to exist. The options seem to be invari-
ably grounded in the nuclear model. °6 For example, Judge Redman
of Idaho's Fifth Judicial District recently recommended that men
should be solely financially responsible for the children living with
them, whether the children are their own biological children or
stepchildren.0 7 Judge Redman asks the question: "Who should
support this child born to mom and dad, since divorced, who has
lived with mom's new spouses Carl, David, and now Fred, where
dad has just married a third time and has six other children and
two new stepchildren?"2 8 The judge pointed out that the conception
of children is often unintentional and, "[i]f we are not going to hold
people to a marriage contract entered into freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily with full intent, then why should we hold them
financially responsible for a sexual act that may or may not have
even intended the result?"20 9  Thus, biological parents should
202. See id.
203. Sue Griffith McCutheon, Burger v. Burger: Stepparent Child Support Liability in
Wisconsin, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 881, 883.
204. Id. at 895.
205. See Elliot H. Gourvitz, The Stepparent's Obligation to Support a Spouse's Child, 3
COMPLEAT L. 41, 43 (1986).
206. See generally Marilyn Coleman & Lawrence H. Ganong, Financial Responsibility for
Children Following Divorce and Remarriage, 13 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 445, 450-51 (1992)
[hereinafter Financial Responsibility] (discussing society's adherence to the nuclear family
model and the process by which stepfamilies attempt to reconstruct a nuclear family).
207. See Redman, supra note 185, at 87-88 (discussing the concepts of implied contract and
equitable estoppel, with respect to the obligations of a psychological parent-a stepparent
who has physically and financially supported a stepchild).
208. Id. at 89.
209. Id.
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remain financially responsible for their children, only until the
primary custodial parent marries again.21°
The current system makes no sense, and the only sense that can
be made of it is by drastic legislative change. As a people, we
have lost the will to adhere to great principles, and so I would
encourage that we adhere to at least those that are utilitarian:
simplicity, effectiveness, consistency, and logic.2" '
Requiring all of the stepparents to support all of the
stepchildren, as though they were their own children, is a tempting
solution. Such an option certainly would provide an additional
means for financial support for the stepchildren. However, both
legal academics and a Washington state court "have expressed fear
that requiring stepparents to support stepchildren would discour-
age marriage and encourage informal cohabitation, contrary to
public policy and lessening the strength of family units as the basis
of society."212 Nonetheless, this "fear of discouraging marriage"
explanation may be just a smokescreen. Indeed, well entrenched
existing laws and social policies already discourage marriage.
These include the IRS "marriage penalty,"2 13 as well as policies that
encourage unequal responsibility for household management and
child rearing.21' While neutral in terminology, in reality, those two
examples have a negative outcome, primarily for women, while laws
and policies requiring stepchild financial support would have a
greater negative impact on men.
In response to the aforementioned concerns, the American Bar
Association Model Act Establishing Rights and Duties of Steppar-
ents would require stepparents to assume the duty of support
during the duration of the remarriage, if the child was not ade-
quately supported by the custodial and the noncustodial parent,
while still permitting courts to retain discretion. 215 The Model Act
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Riley, supra note 200, at 1775.
213. See U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE, supra note 36, at 26-27; see also U.S. SENATE JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, ENDING THE MARRIAGE PENALTY 1 (1998), available in United States
Senate Joint Economic Committee, Ending the Marriage Penalty (last modified March, 1998)
<http:/www.senate.gov/-jec/newnmarriage.html> (defining the marriage penalty as "the extra
taxes a couple has to pay because they don't get treated like partners, sharing their incomes
equally for tax purposes.").
214. See Phyllis Schlafly, Defending Domestic Tranquility from Feminism's Assault on
Marriage and Motherhood, 2 TEX. REV. L. POL. 293, 299 (1998).
215. See MODEL AcT ESTABLISHING RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STEPPARENTS, in Tenenbaum,
supra note 77, at 137-40.
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is a work-in-progress; the Family Law Section of the American Bar
Association continues to consider such factors as: standards for the
court; psychological bonds between the stepparent and the step-
child; and what the stepparent-stepchild relationship should be if
the stepparent and custodial parent divorced.216 The underlying
struggle appears to be maintaining the non-custodial parents'
incentives to support their children if stepparents are also given
support responsibilities.
Trends toward legislative reforms exist as well. Professor
Margaret Mahoney, for example, has called for legislation along the
lines of the British Matrimonial Causes Act.217 This Act protects
"the child of the family" by having courts examine the length of the
marriage, the earning potentials of the custodial parent and the
stepparent, and the needs of the stepchild.218 This approach is
flexible and case-specific, incorporating a type of estoppel, but
without the limitations currently imposed in the United States." 9
Such an approach seems to have the advantages of recognizing that
each family is different and that general rules often are inappropri-
ate.
Another proposal addressing the extension of child support
responsibility revolves around the suggestion that support obliga-
tions ought to be based on the estoppel theory-both during and
after marriages.22 ° Scholars suggesting this approach argue that
the use of the estoppel theory would "both lessen role ambiguity and
role conflict."221 This approach would help both stepparents and
biological parents understand that each has a definite financial
responsibility to the children. Additionally, this option would
recognize the "uniqueness" factor in every stepfamily, as "the
inherent flexibility [of the 'estoppel theory'] recognizes . . . that
stepfamilies are not uniform and that different age and gender
combinations among stepparents and stepchildren yield different
relationships. 222
The division of stepparents into two classes is another proposed
solution: "those who are 'de facto' parents and those who are
not."223 A de facto parent is someone who is "legally married to a
216. See id.
217. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child
Relationship, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 38, 59 (1984) [hereinafter Stepparent-Child Relationship].
218. See id. at 60.
219. See id.
220. See Fine & Fine, supra note 97, at 75.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Mason & Simon, supra note 102, at 468.
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natural parent who primarily reside[s] with the stepchild or
provides at least 50 percent of the stepchild's support."224 Under
this definition, a de facto parent would function as a biological
parent, with the same "rights, obligations, and presumptions" that
a biological parent has, both in marriage and after the marriage,
whether ended by either divorce or death.22 5  Non-residential
stepparents, however, would basically disappear from federal
policy.22 6
While the de facto portion of the Mason and Simon proposal is
appealing, the loss of recognition for stepparents who do not meet
the de facto parent requirements is troubling. Many non de facto
stepparents are loving and actively involved in their stepchildren's
lives. These people may be the very stepparents who voluntarily
give their time and financial resources to their stepchildren, and it
would be detrimental to the stepparent-stepchild relationship for
this stepparent to officially disappear.
A benefit behind this proposal, however, is the step toward the
crystallization of the roles and obligations of stepparents. Recogniz-
ing that family law issues fall within states' jurisdictions, "a
complete legal role for the stepparent as a de facto parent can only
be established by encouraging reform in this confused arena."227 To
set a de facto parent proposal into operation, the first step includes
"insist[ing] that all states pass stepparent general support obliga-
tion laws which would require stepparents [to] act ... as de facto
parents to support their stepchildren as they do their natural
children."22 The obligation imposed by such a law would need to
contain clear guidelines delineating how child support would be
divided between the noncustodial biological parent and the
stepparent. 229 Because of the current trend toward federalism in
the political arena, obtaining approval from all of the states to
create such a uniform statute would be a gargantuan task. After
all, the states have not even agreed on a common definition of
stepfamily terminology.
Assuming uniform state laws are currently a pipedream at
best, "[tihe next logical ... step would be to require states to impose
child support obligations on stepparents following the death of the
224. Id. at 469.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 477.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 478.
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natural parent or his or her divorce from the stepparent."230 While
it is a stretch.to imagine imposing financial responsibility based
upon someone else's death, we already have the vehicles in place,
with in loco parentis and equitable estoppel, to implement continu-
ing financial responsibility following a divorce. 31
As stepparents are being given financial responsibility for
stepchildren, they should also receive custodial rights.232 Using the
doctrine of in loco parentis, this approach recognizes that the
natural parent is typically alive, and sometimes active, as a
parent-so a child could officially benefit from two moms and/or two
dads who are involved in day-to-day parenting.233 In this respect,
children can, and often do, have more than one mother or father.
Whether by law or happenstance, stepparents already have some
responsibility for stepchildren. What stepparents do not seem to
have, however, are rights.
Mason and Simon would like federal policy to take the initia-
tive when defining a parental status for residential stepparents.234
Because states presently make their own separate determinations
about stepparent status, if the United States is to have a clearly
defined position, it must come through a federal initiative. 235 This
proposal is beneficial because "[a] clear definition of stepparent as
[a] de facto parent would eliminate the inconsistencies regarding
stepparents which plague current federal policies."236 In addition,
this de facto relationship could provide a needed and important
protective cushion for children.
"[TIhere can be no doubt that the variety of social practices
poses new and pressing questions for legal definitions of family,
family benefits, and family obligations."237 This lack of consensus
therefore reinforces the uncertainty in the status of stepparents.
The financial struggles of stepfamilies, especially mothers, to meet
the daily financial needs of growing children, occur in the face of a
legal system trying to function with conflicting messages from laws
and policies that do not serve either the children or the basic family
values, regardless of the family's form. At the present time, it
seems that any reform that would make it easier for stepfamilies to
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 113-66 and accompanying text.
232. See Mason & Simon, supra note 102, at 479.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 481.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. Minow, supra note 112, at 277.
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function is suspect because it might remove "incentives" for people
to get and stay married.
III. INHERITANCE AND THE GREAT ESTATE
It is difficult to discuss inheritance in a marriage. Not knowing
what to say can lead to saying nothing at all-a phenomenon
termed passive neglect. However, passive neglect in a stepfamily
can lead to unwelcome surprises because inheritance and tax
statutes are patterned after the traditional family.23
When a child's parent marries an individual who is not the
child's other biological parent, a stepfamily is formed. Stepfamilies
have become common households;2 9 in 1990, almost half of all
marriages were remarriages.2 40 While not all of these marriages
joined one or both partners with children from a prior relationship,
"children living with two parents today are more likely to be living
in a family that is not composed of two biological parents and only
full biological siblings .... [tihey are more likely to have steppar-
ents and half brothers/sisters than ever before."24'
When counting the number of stepfamily households in
America, the Census Bureau defines stepfamily as "a 'married-
couple family' with at least one stepchild of the householder
present, where the householder is the husband."242 Notably, the
Census Bureau's limited definition of a stepfamily does not include
a stepfamily where an adult marries the noncustodial parent of
minor children. Instead, the Census Bureau includes only the
stepfamily where an adult marries the custodial parent of minor
children. This definition does not recognize the current emphasis
on visitation and joint parenting by both biological parents, and also
does not recognize that families continue their emotional and finan-
cial relationships with both biological children and stepchildren,
even after the children become adults.
This same narrow definition has, for the most part, been
invoked in discussions about stepfamilies in the legal context. The
legal system has not broadened its concept of family to include
238. See generally Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the
Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 377-78
(1988) (describing how tax laws generally favor an adopted or natural child over a stepchild).
239. See Glick, Stepparents Are Getting Shortchanged, supra note 22, at 631.
240. See Clarke, supra note 11, at 4.
241. Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 12.
242. U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 79, at B-15.
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stepfamilies. Thus, traditional first-married family legal rights and
obligations are not extended to stepfamily members.243
It is important to be aware of the legal context regarding
inheritance issues that face stepfamilies. The quality of stepparent-
stepchild relationships may be adversely affected by the ambiguous
nature of the legal relationship between stepparents and step-
children.244 Studies have generally found that negative stereotypes
of stepfamilies exist.245 In addition, stepparents and stepchildren
may have less of a commitment to each other without clear legal
obligations, 246 as the law generally only requires temporary
commitments in stepfamilies.247  Because changes in the laws
reflect public views, social perceptions of stepfamilies may be
reflected in American laws.24
Thus, conflicts between the children from one marriage and the
spouse of another also result from a growing number of multiple
marriages.249 Splintered loyalties, additional responsibilities, and
the changing needs of families exist in every stepfamily. In
situations where relationships between adults and stepchildren are
strained, inheritance pre-planning may be difficult to achieve.
However, when decisions must be made in times of crisis, those
tenuous legal relationships hold an even greater potential for family
conflict and stress.25° Many individuals prefer to believe that the
extended family members will do the right thing for each
other-that inheritance decisions, if left alone, will take care of
themselves. The fact is, inheritance decisions will not take care of
themselves.
243. See Mahoney, supra note 2, at 918.
244. See Mark A. Fine, A Social Science Perspective on Stepfamily Law: Suggestions for
Legal Reform, 38 FAM. REL. 53, 55 (1989).
245. See Linda R. Bryan et al., Person Perception: Family Structure as a Cue for
Stereotyping, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 169, 173 (1986).
246. See Glick, Stepparents Are Getting Shortchanged, supra note 22, at 647.
247. See Fine, supra note 244, at 55.
248. Cf Mark A. Fine & David Fine, Recent Changes in Laws Affecting Stepfamilies:
Suggestions for Legal Reform, 41 FAM. REL. 334, 339 (1992) [hereinafter Suggestions for
Legal Reform] (discussing changes in stepfamily law and the possible influences that the
changes may have on stepfamilies).
249. See Carolyn L. Dessin, The Troubled Relationship of Will Contracts and Spousal
Protection: Time for an Amicable Separation, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 435, 437 (1996).
250. See Margorie Engel, Steps Ahead with Daisy Petals: They Love Me Not, Inheritance,
Address at the 12th Annual Stepfamily Conference (July 20, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Engel, Inheritance].
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A. The Partnership Theory of Marriage
The partnership theory of marriage contends that marriage is
an economic partnership, much like a joint venture or business
partnership.25 ' The partnership theory of marriage can be traced
back to a 1963 report issued by the Committee on Civil and Political
Rights.252 The prefatory notes to the Uniform Marital Property
Act253 articulate this partnership theory of marriage in the following
way:
Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a
different but equally important contribution. This fact has
become increasingly recognized in the realities of American
family living. While the laws of other countries have reflected
this trend, family laws in the United States have lagged
behind."
The partnership theory brings economics in line with behavior,
55
and as such, the partnership theory is sometimes called the
"contribution" theory as it recognizes that each spouse contributes
to the marital wealth by earning wages, as well as through
activities that support wage earning.256 The partnership theory of
marriage is also defined "as an expression of the presumed intent
of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis,
share and share alike."
257
The partnership theory promotes gender equality because a
couple's total resources are shared, and gender-linked roles become
less important.25 Some courts also note the state's interest in
financially protecting the surviving spouse through this theory.259
Apparently, legislatures that enact a form of spousal protection
251. See Waggoner, supra note 6, at 716.
252. See id. at n.96 ("One of earliest American expressions of the partnership theory of
marriage appears in the 1963 Report of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the
President's Commission on the Status of Women.").
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 717-18 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the
Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 198-99
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herman H. Kay eds., 1990)).
256. See id. at 717.
257. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw 131 (1989); see also
Waggoner, supra note 6, at 716-17.
258. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 199 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990).
259. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 879 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Ark. 1994).
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have chosen to limit testamentary freedom of the couple in order to
ensure an equal distribution of the couple's assets, thus furthering
the public good.
B. Wills and Will Contracts
.The United States Constitution does not protect an individual's
right to make wills.26 Nevertheless, the right has extensive
historical recognition.26' If the state legislature has not specifically
disallowed a disposition, a decedent can leave her property to
anyone she chooses.2" 2 The state does, however, make rulings to
protect a surviving spouse.26" Additionally, as Carolyn Dessin
points out, "[s] ome mechanism... exists in each state for protecting.
a surviving spouse from intentional or unintentional total disinheri-
tance."2 ' This mechanism may be "a result from the recognition...
that marriage is the most important family relationship."
265
American probate law has traditionally barred the complete
disinheritance of the surviving spouse.266 The spouse, however, may
voluntarily waive this protection in a prenuptial or antenuptial
agreement. 67  It has been recognized, though, that "spousal
protection [can] not be waived by the unilateral act of a person
other than the surviving spouse."268
This position on waivers also applies in cases of qualified-plan
spousal annuities.269 In Hurwitz v. Sher,270 Mr. Hurwitz owned a
qualified retirement plan. He also had a prenuptial agreement with
his third wife, waiving all rights to each other's property. The court
ruled that a spouse can agree to waive the payment of the annuity,
even though there is a requirement that qualified plans provide for
payment of a spousal survivor annuity.27 1 The key word in this case
260. See Irving Trust v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942).
261. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH,
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 1, 9-18 (Edward C.
Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).
262. See Dessin, supra note 249, at 437.
263. See id. at 437 & n.13.
264. Id. at 436. For a sampling of several state statutes that have such protection
mechanisms, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-70 (1997); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21610 (West 1997); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-69.1 (Michie 1998).
265. Dessin, supra note 249, at 453 (citing GLENDON, supra note 257, at 238-40).
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. Id. at 454 (citing Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 263 (Md. 1989)).
269. See MARGORIE ENGEL, THE DIVORCE DECISIONS WORKBOOK 90 (1992) [hereinafter
DIVORCE DECISIONS WORKBOOK] (describing various retirement plans).
270. 982 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1992).
271. See id. at 781; see also Prenuptial Agreement Can't Waive Qualified Plan Spousal
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was "spouse." When Mr. Hurwitz died, the court ruled that the
prenuptial agreement did not meet the requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code § 417(a).2 72 The Code addresses waivers between
married partners, and the Hurwitz's did not sign the agreement
while they were married.273 Therefore, the Hurwitz's agreement
and waiver failed to fall within the scope of the Internal Revenue
Code and thus failed to be binding.
In another case, the husband's will gave property to his wife
"during her life or for so long as she shall retain the name of
Schwarzbarth."2 74  The remainder or contingent beneficiaries
claimed that she forfeited the property when she began to use her
new husband's name from time to time. The court, however, held
that a periodic use of her new husband's name was not enough to
"breach that condition."2 75 Therefore, the wife had not waived her
right to spousal protection.276
C. The Second Wife and Will Contracts
The idea of a will contract has most often been used as an
estate planning device to ensure that the surviving spouse does not
alter the agreed-upon plan after the first spouse's death. Will
contracts have also been used in divorce agreements.277
In a review of will contracts, case law is inconsistent-some
decisions favor the contract beneficiary,278 while some favor the
surviving spouse."' In addition, some decisions apply the rules of
contract law and property law, while others consider the circum-
stances of each particular case.28° One Arkansas court demon-
strated the types of conflicts among family members that can result
from a will contract when the surviving spouse remarries.8 1 In
Gregory v. Gregory, a husband and wife each signed a will providing
that the estate of the first spouse to die would be held in trust for
Annuity, J. ACCT., June 25, 1993, at 25 (describing Hurwitz u. Sher).
272. See Hurwitz, 982 F.2d at 781.
273. See id.
274. In re Estate of Schwarzbarth, 466 A.2d 1382, 1384 (Pa. 1983).
275. Jean A. Mortland, Intent as to Stepchildren, Remarriage Construed, 11 EST. PLAN.
122, 122 (1984) (commenting on In re Estate of Schwarzbarth).
276. See Schwarzbarth, 466 A-2d at 1386-87.
277. See Dessin, supra note 249, at 440.
278. See, e.g., Keats v. Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645, 652 (I1. App. Ct. 1968).
279. See, e.g., Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 266 (Md. 1989).
280. See Dessin, supra note 249, at 457.
281. See generally Gregory v. Estate of Gregory, 866 S.W.2d 379 (Ark. 1993) (showing
family conflicts that result from will contracts).
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the surviving spouse and the couple's children.21 2  After the
surviving spouse's death, his or her estate would be added to the
trust.2 3 When Mrs. Gregory died, her property was placed in trust.
Mr. Gregory later remarried.2 4 After his death, his second wife
filed to claim her statutory allowance against the will.28 5 Her claim
was denied by the probate court which held that the children's
rights were more important than the second wife's rights.28 6 The
Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed, holding that the will contract
meant that the second wife had no legal claim to the husband's
property.
28 7
Another case in the estate planning context, Runbenstein v.
Mueller,28 also held that contract beneficiaries take precedence
over surviving spouses." 9 The court found that a joint will required
that property received by the survivor under the joint will be held
in trust for the named beneficiaries.290 Thus, when the husband
remarried, the second wife had no elective share rights because the
will contract meant that the husband held only a life estate.29'
Because the husband did not actually have a personal estate, the
second wife had no right of election with respect to the property,
292
once again upholding the will contract to the detriment of the
second wife.
Some courts base their determinations about the legality of a
will contract upon whether the surviving spouse knew about the
will contract. In Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen,293 the court determined
that the second wife could not claim a spousal share because she
had full knowledge of the contract.294 On the other hand, in Tod v.
Fuller,295 a Florida court found for the surviving spouse simply
because she did not know about her deceased spouse's will
contract.296 The importance of this holding is questionable, though,
282. See id. at 380-81.
283. See id.; see also Dessin, supra note 249, at 456 (commenting on Gregory v. Estate of
Gregory).




288. 225 N.E.2d 540 (N.Y. 1967).
289. See id. at 543.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 542.
292. See id.
293. 113 P.2d 495 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
294. See id. at 500-01.
295. 78 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1955).
296. See id. at 713-14.
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because it may be deemed as a restraint on marriage and therefore
unenforceable as violative of public policy.
A key issue involved with will contracts consists of determining
which property is covered by the agreement. This issue involves
determining whether property acquired after the death of one
spouse should be considered part of the contract. One method to
separate pre-remarriage and post-remarriage assets is to take a
financial "snapshot" at the time of the remarriage.297 Thus, assets
brought to the remarriage would be subject to the will contract and
the second spouse could only receive a spousal share of property
acquired after the remarriage.2 98 However, the courts have
proposed that a surviving spouse may be entitled to spousal share
rights "only if it is proven that the property did not derive from the
collective property of the parties to the contract."299 This rule
makes separating assets before and after remarriage difficult
because meeting the terms of such a test requires impeccable
bookkeeping.
In addition, this rule raises the question as to whether an
earlier will contract should be permitted to deny a subsequent
spouse's financial protection. Even though precedent exists for
recognizing the rights of any beneficiary under a will, including the
spouse and the children, those beneficiary rights are subject to the
prior depletion of assets and regulated limits.3"' However, in In re
Estate ofMullin, a Kansas court determined that a spouse could not
be deprived of financial protection through either disinheritance or
a will contract.3 ' Indeed, the court's holding in Mullin is congruent
with the argument that "a testator should not be permitted to
contract to do that which he cannot otherwise do-completely
disinherit his spouse."30 2
Some scholars have asserted that "the inheritance rights of the
surviving spouses have steadily improved."303 If this observation is
correct, why have courts allowed subsequent surviving wives to be
stripped of financial protection as the result of an earlier will
contract?304 This observation may be based upon the equitable
assumption that favors couples who have been married for a longer
297. See Orley R. Lilly, Jr., Will Contracts: Contract Rights in Conflict with Spousal
Rights, 20 TULSA L.J. 197, 231 (1984).
298. See id.
299. Dessin, supra note 249, at 463.
300. See, e.g., In re Nicholson's Will, 267 N.Y.S.2d 719, 725 (Misc. 2d 1966).
301. See In re Estate v. Mullin, 443 P.2d 331, 337-38 (Kan. 1968).
302. Dessin, supra note 249, at 479.
303. GLENDON, supra note 257, at 238.
304. See, e.g., Keats v. Cates, 241 N.E.2d 645, 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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period of time. This equitable assumption is incorrect, however,
because second marriages often last longer than first marriages. 315
D. The Probate Codes
"Every estate plan consists of basically three elements:
property ownership, beneficiary designations, and the probate
code."30 6  Even though "[piroperty ownership and beneficiary
designations are not affected by the non-traditional family, . . .
probate codes.., are generally designed to protect the traditional
marriage family."307  Because of this emphasis on the first or
traditional families, a step-family "faces . . . some very special
estate planning problems."3 °8
The first problem stepfamilies encounter is the distribution of
the property to the appropriate beneficiaries, 30 9 a process made
more difficult when inheritance statutes and probate codes do not
recognize the stepfamily as a valid family unit.310 Another estate
planning problem for stepfamilies consists of "minimizing death
taxes [,]"31' especially since "It]ax codes.., often penalize the non-
traditional family."312 Finally, "planning for the family's personal
needs" 313 is yet another difficulty stepfamilies face because laws
based on traditional families do not work well for stepfamilies. 314
A number of studies indicate that the majority of people die
intestate-without a valid will.315 Clearly, it is important to have
comprehensive information for making rules about intestate
succession.316 In 1969, efforts began to reform intestate succession
statutes with the proposal of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).317
305. See Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at 70. But see Clarke, supra note 11,
at 4.









315. See Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 243 (1963); Jaki K Samuelson & Dennis Thorson, A
Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and
Uniform Probate Codes, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1978).
316. See John W. Fisher, II & Scott A. Curnutte, Reforming the Law of Intestate
Succession and Elective Shares: New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61,
65 (1990).
317. See id. at 63.
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Hereinafter, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws began the reforming process with the approval of the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association.318 Sixteen
states later adopted the UPC or portions of it.319
E. Revised Uniform Probate Code (RUPC)
By 1990, the Commissioners drafted a newer version of the
UPC. 320 The Revised Uniform Probate Code (RUPC) ostensibly
reflects the lessons learned from years of operating under the
Uniform Probate Code, as well as studies indicating the large
numbers of people who die intestate.3 2' In addition, the Joint
Editorial Board for the UPC considered the American multiple-
marriage society in which individuals who marry more than once
have stepchildren, as well as biological children.322  Thus, the
revisions were designed to "be adopted without the procedural and
other provisions of the full UPC."
3 23
One section of the Revised Uniform Probate Code gives the
surviving spouse a larger share of assets than the original Uniform
Probate Code.3 24  The RUPC combines the spouses' assets to
compute the augmented estate325 when determining both the
surviving spouse's share and the incremental vesting scheme, a
device which was developed to reduce the incidents of windfall that
318. See id.
319. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005 to 13.36.100 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
14-1101 to 14-7308 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-10-101 to 15-17-102 (1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 655.82, 711.50 to 711.512 (West 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:1-101 to 560:8-101
(1997); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to 15-7-307 (1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 1-101 to
8-401 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.471 to 451.481 (West 1998); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to 524.8-103 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101 to 72-6-311
(1998); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to 30-2902 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 to 45-7-
522 (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to 30.1-35-01 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
62-1-100 to 62-7-604 (Law. Co-op. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-1-101 to 29A-8-01
(Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-01 (1998).
320. See Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 316, at 63.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 67-68.
323. Waggoner, supra note 6, at 689.
324. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202,8 U.L.A. 102 (1998).
325. In layman's terms, the "augmented estate" means the sum of the value of the
decedent's probate estate (reduced by expenses such as funeral, administration, exemptions,
enforceable claims), the value of the decedent's reclaimable estate (real or personal property
not included in the probate estate), the value of property the surviving spouse receives by
reason of the decedents death (life insurance and retirement plan), and the value of property
owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death. All property is valued as of the date
of the decedents death. See Fisher & Curnette, supra note 316, at 110 (citing the REVISED
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 102 (1985)).
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might be a problem for short term, late-in-life second marriages
under the Uniform Probate Code.326 The incremental vesting
scheme contained in the RUPC merges the decedent's and the
surviving spouse's augmented estates, following the single partner-
ship theory.327 This incremental vesting scheme therefore avoids
the need for tracing joint and separate money.32 Moreover, the
surviving spouse's share is calculated from the combined aug-
mented estate.329 While the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half
of the combined augmented estate, this share vests incrementally
330over time.
The major advantage of this approach is that it accomplishes
the dual purposes of forced share law-support for the surviving
spouse and recognition of the contribution which the spouse
326. See id. at 108-09.
327. See Charles H. Whitebread, The Uniform Probate Code's Nod to the Partnership
Theory of Marriage: The 1990 Elective Share Revisions, 11 PROB. L.J. 125, 129 (1992).
328. See Fisher & Curnette, supra note 316, at 108.
329. See id. at 108-11; see also Whitebread, supra note 327, at 129 (describing the way that
the "elective share entitlement for a surviving spouse" is calculated).
330. See Fisher & Curnette, supra note 316, at 108; Whitebread, supra note 327, at 129-
32; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 102 (1998). This section of the Uniform Probate
Code provides:
(a) Elective share amount. The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies
domiciled in this State has a right of election, under the limitations
and conditions stated in this Part, to take an elective share amount
equal to the value of the elective share %age of the augmented estate,
determined by the length of time the spouse and the decedent were
married to each other, in accordance with the following schedule:
If the decedent and the spouse were married to each other, the
elective-share percentage is:
Less than I year
1 year but less than 2 years
2 years but less than 3 years
3 years but less than 4 years
4 years but less than 5 years
5 years but less than 6 years
6 years but less than 7 years
7 years but less than 8 years
8 years but less than 9 years
9 years but less than 10 years
10 years but less than 11 years
11 years but less than 12 years
12 years but less than 13 years
13 years but less than 14 years
14 years but less than 15 years
15 years or more
Supplemental amount only
3% of the augmented estate
6% of the augmented estate
9% of the augmented estate
12% of the augmented estate
15% of the augmented estate
18% of the augmented estate
21% of the augmented estate
24% of the augmented estate
27% of the augmented estate
30% of the augmented estate
34% of the augmented estate
38% of the augmented estate
42% of the augmented estate
46% of the augmented estate
50% of the augmented estate
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made to the decedent's estate-in a mechanical fashion which
does not require judicial intervention to reach an equitable
result.33'
The "incremental vesting" scheme supports the contemporary view
of marriage as an economic partnership, but only for the duration
of the marriage.332
F. Problems in the RUPC for Stepfamilies
The 1990 revisions to the UPC have created potential
problems.333 "[Ilt is nearly impossible for a spouse to maintain
separate property without opting out of the entire elective share
system through a premarital or postmarital agreement."334 In
addition, "[ilf the surviving spouse already has over half of the
augmented estate titled in his or her name, the revised UPC does
not entitle [the spouse] to receive additional property."335 It is
important, however, to remember that this rule applies only in
cases of intestacy. Bequests made in a will are not affected by this
provision in the RUPC.
Under the intestacy rules, when the spouse with the smaller
share of the marital property dies first, that spouse could only
devise assets titled in her name.336 Thus, the "decedent's estate
[has] no rights to assets in the surviving spouse's estate."337 There
are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first is that
"an assumption exists that the surviving spouse will devise the
property in a manner consistent with the decedent's wishes."338 A
second possible explanation is that "an assumption exists that a
more financially dependent spouse has no legitimate claim to
accumulations during the marriage." 3 9 This explanation, however,
does not fit with the partnership theory of marriage. "If America is
really looking for a uniform system of marital property rights that
completely incorporates the partnership theory of marriage,
331. Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 316, at 108.
332. See id. at 109.
333. See Whitebread, supra note 327, at 129-32.
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eventually all states will have to abandon elective or forced share
law and adopt some sort of community property system."340
The RUPC is also problematic for long-term, later-in-life
marriages. Consider the hypothetical case of an elderly couple who
decide to remarry. They both have children and assets from a prior
marriage. This second marriage is a childless marriage, and they
make modest contributions to the growth of each other's assets.
Under the RUPC, their -testamentary freedom is significantly
limited. Hence, they cannot devise most of their respective estates
to their own children and grandchildren. A reasonable statute of
intestate succession, however, requires compromise. While it
cannot adequately meet unique and specific needs, knowledge of the
RUPC may "encourage older people not to marry or to enter [into]
premarital agreements."34' A will or appropriate will substitute
must be viewed as the solution.
G. Probate Code, State Code, and Stepchildren
A potential complication arises for stepfamily relationships
when inheritance rights, almost without exception, are granted only
to the "'issue' or 'descendants' of the decedent and the decedent's
ancestors."342 The Probate Code requires a chain of parent-child
relationships at each generation in order to grant inheritance rights
and generally does not consider a stepchild eligible for inheritance
from the stepparent.343
Some exceptions to the preceding rule exist. For instance, some
state statutes recognize a decedent's stepchildren when no other
relatives are alive and the property would otherwise revert to the
state.344 However, even when a stepparent has a will referring to
stepchildren as "children," a court may still focus on the bloodline.
Bloodline was the primary consideration in a Washington case
where a stepfather left a small bequest to five "children," four of
whom were his stepchildren."45 Even though the five children were
expressly named in the will, the court ignored the will bequests for
the four named stepchildren, despite the fact that the biological
child had predeceased his father.346 Nonetheless, when the estate
340. Id. at 142.
341. Id. at 139.
342. Lovas, supra note 238, at 367.
343. See id. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-104 (1997) (providing specifically that
stepchildren do not inherit).
344. See Lovas, supra note 238, at 377.
345. See In re Estate of Smith, 299 P.2d 550 (Wash. 1956).
346. See id. at 553; see also Thomas M. Hanson, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren:
POCKETS OF POVERTY
passed through intestate succession, the stepchildren inherited
from their stepfather under the applicable statute that "provid [ed]
for inheritance from a stepparent in order to avoid escheat of the
property to the state."347
Despite the proceeding exceptions, it is not an easy task to
align public policy and intestacy laws to provide stepchildren with
the same rights as biological children. While California recognizes
the inheritance rights of stepchildren more than most states, it still
fails to recognize them at the same level as biological children.348
Even though stepchildren are "in line for inheritance ahead of
[some] relatives," they come "after grandparents and issue of
grandparents."349 In addition, half-blood siblings may "inherit from
and through each other,... [thus allowing] a stepchild to inherit
through a predeceased half-brother or half-sister."35
The RUPC assumes that "the decedent would want to favor a
biological child."351' Thus, the intestacy codes continue to ignore
families in remarriage situations, and the societal bias against
stepfamilies and stepchildren is encouraged in the laws. The
unequal treatment of a stepchild and a biological child sends the
legal message that the stepchild is the more marginal child. More
states should follow California's lead to allow stepfamily members
to inherit from each other whenever a relationship developed
between a child and a stepparent.352
H. Adoption, "Legal Barrier to Adoption," and "Equitable
Adoption"
"An adoption formalizes the stepparent-child relationship and
guarantees its recognition for virtually all legal purposes.
" 311
Regulated by state statutes, the "best interests of the child" is the
legal standard used in adoption cases.35 ' Stepparent adoption does
not fit the classic model of adoption where the state places the child
with two adults, neither of whom is related to the child. Rather, in
California Leads the Way, But Has It Gone Far Enough, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 264 (1995)
(explaining In re Estate of Smith).
347. Hanson, supra note 346, at 264.
348. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991).
349. Lovas, supra note 238, at 377; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1998).
350. Lovas, supra note 238, at 378; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6406 (West 1998).
351. Glick, Stepparents Are Getting Shortchanged, supra note 22, at 649-50 (citation
omitted).
352. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21115(b) (West 1991).
353. STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 177.
354. See id. at 162.
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a stepparent adoption, the adoptive parent is married to the
custodial parent. Stepparent adoption has led to the "reconsidera-
tion of adoption as an all-or-nothing proposition for both the
biological parent and the adoptive stepparent."355 Specific consider-
ations for stepparent adoptions include continuing visitation rights
for the non-custodial parent and inheritance rights for the stepchild
from both biological parents and the adoptive stepparent.
Traditionally, adoption of a child ended all connections, legal
and personal, with any biological parent.356 The Alaska Supreme
Court expressly questioned the wisdom of this policy.
[The] very problem now before us is an increasingly common
occurrence, given the increase in divorce and remarriage in our
society.... Well-known commentators have proposed "incom-
plete adoption" as a middle approach that would better accom-
modate the interests of both the stepparent and the
noncustodial natural parent by giving . . . rights to each.
However, the Alaska legislature apparently has not yet
considered this modern approach that would allow the courts a
more reasonable choice in deciding stepfamily cases .... We are
therefore left with the harsh choices inherent in deciding
between adoption or no adoption at all.357
Between 1986 and 1991, the Alaska Legislature revised its statute,
which now reads: "Nothing in this chapter prohibits an adoption
that allows visitation between the adopted person and that person's
natural parents or other relatives."35 Other states also have
similar provisions.359
As previously stated, in the traditional model of adoption, an
adoption decree terminates financial rights and duties, including
mutual rights of inheritance and parental support responsibili-
ties.36 ° While adoptive parents typically assume child support
responsibility, states do not have uniform laws regulating the
status of intestacy inheritance rights from an adopted child's
biological relatives, once the adoption has been completed.36'
Without a will specifically naming the child, most states "com-
355. Id. at 163.
356. See id. at 179.
357. In re J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948, 951-52 (Alaska 1986).
358. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130(c) (Michie 1991).
359. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-312(e) (1991) (allowing for continuing
connections between an adopted child and the biological parent).
360. See STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAw, supra note 88, at 179.
361. See id.
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pletely sever all rights between an adopted child and [the biological
parent]"362 who gave the child up for adoption to the stepparent.363
According to the RUPC:
An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting
parent or parents and not of his [or her] natural parents, but
adoption of a child by the spouse of either natural parent has no
effect on... the relationship between the child and that natural
parent or... the right of the child... to inherit from or through
the other natural parent. 3
The continuance of biological inheritance rights after a stepparent
adoption undoubtedly reflects the expectation of bloodline testa-
mentary desires. "The Uniform Probate Code drafters assumed
that most family members would wish to benefit adopted children
in these circumstances."365
In one Minnesota case, the court denied inheritance rights to
unadopted stepdaughters, failing to uphold an equitable adoption
which would allow the stepdaughters to inherit from their stepfa-
ther despite his failure to adopt them officially.366 The girls were
seven and eight years old when they became Mr. Berge's stepdaugh-
ters and began using his name.367 He provided educational and
financial support for the remainder of their childhood,3 6s referred to
his stepdaughters as his girls,369 and continued to rear them after
their mother died.37° Mr. Berge had made verbal statements that
he intended to disinherit his blood relatives and to leave all of his
property to the girls.37' When Mr. Berge died without a will, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the relationship between
stepfather and stepdaughters did not meet its criteria of an




364. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b), 8 U.L.A. 82 (1998).
365. STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 180.
366. See In re Estate of Berge, 47 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1951); see also STEPFAMILIES AND THE
LAW, supra note 88, at 62 (commenting on In re Estate of Berge).
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Courts almost always find insufficient proof for equitable
adoption 373 because "the conduct of the parties was as consistent
with a normal stepparent-stepchild relationship as with a contract
to adopt."374 Thus, if stepchildren are to inherit from stepparents,
they must be named beneficiaries in the stepparent's will.3
75
However, occasionally courts have employed a liberal interpre-
tation of the stepparent-stepchild relationship. For example, in
Foster v. Cheek,376 the court recognized the stepchild's claim for
equitable adoption because the custodial grandparents had been
promised that the adoption would occur.3 77 Nevertheless, emphatic
limitations of the equitable adoption doctrine for stepchildren exist,
and the relationship is better served if the will contract is put in
writing.378
I. Stepparent Wills and Stepchildren Beneficiaries
Although courts typically enforce express gifts to stepfamily
members,379 the law of wills generally assumes that testators do not
view stepfamily members as family members. 30 Thus, "[elven in
the law of wills, stepfamily members may face procedural difficul-
ties in becoming beneficiaries of inheritance."381
For example, Reed Hunt's validly executed will demonstrates
the need for clear language when drafting a will.382 Mr. Hunt's will
recited the names of his stepchildren, bequeathed five dollars to any
person "established by a court of law to be a child of mine,"38 3 and
specifically noted intentional disinheritance of any heirs not
mentioned in the will.3 4 Claiming that the will did not expressly
provide a bequest to any person, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the Hunt estate passed to his heirs under the intestacy
373. See id.; see also STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 62 (examining In re
Estate of Berge).
374. STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAw, supra note 88, at 61; see also Estate of Stewart, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding proof of equitable adoption insufficient); In re Estate of
Crossman, 377 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Defoeldvar v. Defoeldvar, 666
S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
375. See STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 62.
376. 96 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. 1957).
377. See id. at 549.
378. See STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 62.
379. See id. at 53.
380. See id.
381. Suggestions for Legal Reform, supra note 248, at 336.
382. See In re Estate of Hunt, 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992).
383. Id. at 873.
384. See id.
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statutes.8 5 Pointing to legal confusion concerning relationships
between stepparents and stepchildren, this Court had two dissent-
ing judges who viewed the stepchildren as beneficiaries under the
doctrine of gift by implication.386
When the language of a will bequeaths the entire estate to one's
spouse, with no reference demonstrating an intent to bequeath a
life estate, and subsequent bequests to include both biological
children and stepchildren, the surviving spouse is entitled to make
a new will when stepchildren are not specifically mentioned.8 ' For
example, in Larison v. Record,388 two stepsisters did not receive
inheritances from their stepmother when she died six years after
their father died, even though the stepmother's combined estate
included their father's entire estate. 9 When the will revealed that
their stepmother's biological daughter was her sole beneficiary, the
stepdaughters filed a lawsuit.39° The circuit court held that the
biological daughter of the decedent was entitled to the estate.39'
Demonstrating typical confusion over the status of inheritance
rights of biological children and stepchildren, the appellate court
reversed the' decision.392 Mrs. Berge's biological daughter filed a
further appeal and, by unanimous opinion, the high court ruled that
the surviving wife had been free to make a new will.393 Because the
biological parent and the stepparent failed to specify in their jointly
written will whether or not all three children would inherit the
combined estate from each of them, the stepchildren were not
viewed as full family members entitled to inheritance.394
Despite the general belief that stepfamily relationships are not
viewed as true family relationships, in Chambers v. Warren,395 a
stepmother willed all of her property to her husband, and in the
event that she and her husband died simultaneously, her property
would go to her stepchildren.3 96 The stepmother also provided that
if any of her property remained in her husband's hands at the time
385. See id. at 875.
386. See id. at 875-76.
387. See Yosh Golden, Stepsisters Not Entitled to Inheritance: Supreme Court, 133 CHIC.
DAILY L. BULL., June 10, 1987, at 3.
388. 512 N.E.2d 1251 (I1. 1987).
389. See id. at 1252.
390. See id. at 1252-53.
391. See id. at 1252.
392. See id.
393. See id. at 1255.
394. See Golden, supra note 387, at 10.
395. 657 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
396. See id. at 5.
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of his death, it would go to her stepchildren.397 Because the
husband died over a year before the stepmother, the stepmother's
blood relatives, who were heirs at law, claimed her estate.398 The
court recognized that the stepmother "clearly express[ed her]
intention [to] devise all of her estate to her stepchildren," and thus
the stepchildren benefited-under the will.399
J. Protecting the Child from Disinheritance
In one Idaho case, the court noted that biological parents
seldom disinherit a child when the family remains together.400
However, "noncustodial parents appear particularly likely to
disinherit their children."4' Because many children are "not part
of a nuclear family at their parent's death,"4" 2 those children most
likely to bear the brunt of disinheritance are children of divorce.4 °3
Moreover, even when custodial mothers remarry, stepfathers have
no legal financial responsibility for their stepchildren, and
stepchildren have minimal standing as their heirs through
intestacy statutes.4" 4 Thus, stepchildren face financial concerns on
both sides.
One primary parental obligation involves supporting minor
children. If parents do not meet this obligation, "society has an
obligation to see that the child is provided for through charitable or
governmental acts."40 5 Thus, the societal burden is likely to
increase with the testamentary freedom the parent possesses
because when a minor child's parent dies, the child's needs
continue.40 6 For non-nuclear stepfamilies with minor children, a
support agreement specifically imposing a continuing obligation on
the parent's estate would be helpful and would help protect the
child in cases of disinheritance.07 These financial obligations might
be met and might protect stepchildren through ongoing support
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. Id. at 6.
400. See In re Estate of Brown, 597 P.2d 23, 25 (Idaho 1979).
401. Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand
Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 2, 9 (1996).
402. Id.
403. See id. at 11.
404. See id.
405. Id. at 4-5.
406. See id. at 7.
407. See id. at 15.
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payments or an acceptable substitute, such as life insurance or a
specific bequest.4"'
K Wrongful Death Statutes
Under the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act, damages for the
statutory beneficiaries are based upon loss of future earnings and
loss of consortium and marital society.40 9 Those beneficiaries may
also receive damages for conscious pain and suffering, as well as
out-of-pocket expenses relating to the death.410 However, a majority
of jurisdictions411 have held that remarriage is not relevant to
wrongful death damages.412 Notwithstanding this fact, remarriage
is financially relevant wherever courts may rule that remarriage
allowed the plaintiff to recover the economic loss. This logic
assumes that the same financial arrangements exist in a second
marriage as in a first marriage.
Wrongful death statutes are classified into three categories
when evaluating the rights of surviving stepfamily members.413 A
handful of states include stepchildren in the list of wrongful death
claimants,414 such as California, Idaho, and Washington.
415
Michigan authorizes claims made by "the children of the deceased's
spouse [,]'116 thereby also including stepchildren. In addition, when
stepchildren are financially dependent upon the stepparent, Alaska,
Arkansas, and Hawaii permit wrongful death awards to the
stepchildren.417 Delaware and Maryland, however, recognize a
stepchild's standing only if no primary beneficiaries exist.4 1s
The remaining statutes make no reference to either stepfamily
members or to "relatives by marriage" as wrongful death beneficia-
ries. When state laws exclude stepfamily members from wrongful
408. See id.
409. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1998).
410. See id.
411. See Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of, or Propriety of Comment as to Plaintiff
Spouse's Remarriage, or Possibility Thereof, in Action for Damages for Death of a Spouse, 88
A.L.R. 3d 926, 928-31 (1978).
412. See Marcia Mobilia Boumil, The Effect of Remarriage on Wrongful Death Damages,
72 MASS. L. REV. 113, 115 (1987).
413. See STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 102.
414. See id.
415. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1997); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.020 (West 1988).
416. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1986).
417. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(d) (Michie
1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1993).
418. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724 (1989); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904
(1998).
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death recovery, the laws "have survived constitutional challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment" 19 because refusing to compensate survivors of wrongful
death victims "has not been regarded as unreasonable in the
constitutional sense."4
20
However, the evaluation of a child's rights to survivorship
benefits should be based on the best interests of the child, step or
not, and not based on some outdated conception of family relations
which fails to account for step-relationships. "[A] stepchild's rights
under intestate succession and wrongful death statutes... [should]
be determined by the actual relationship between stepparent and
stepchild and the best interests of the child, rather than by rules
based on stepfamily status."21
L. Death and Taxes
Stepfamilies face a financial burden because the laws of
inheritance and estate taxation do not acknowledge the prevalence
of stepfamilies.422 As a result of the tax law's failure to adequately
account for stepfamilies, stepchildren often face "higher inheritance
tax rates."423
Margaret Mahoney examined the tax issue, but she reached a
different conclusion. Mahoney sees the courts as being more willing
to recognize stepfamilies for inheritance taxation purposes than in
other areas of inheritance.424 This phenomenon results because
"preferential tax treatment for steprelatives does not interfere with
the rights of any other beneficiary or heir."425 However, even where
stepchildren may be recognized, no guarantee of that same
recognition for stepgrandchildren exists.426
Despite the differing views regarding the role taxation plays in
stepfamilies, one thing is clear: careful planning is necessary to
begin resolving the problem of stepfamily inheritance. The "impact
of the tax incidents [on stepfamily members] can be controlled by
419. STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 110-11.
420. Id. at 111.
421. Michael J. Markoff, Stepfamily Law: Review and Proposals for Change, 18 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 701, 701 (1984).
422. See Lovas, supra note 238, at 382.
423. Id. at 385.




providing adequate liquidity and by specially apportioning the
burden of paying the tax."427
M. Observations
Probate statutes for intestate decedents require developing
presumptions.42 s It is reasonable to make decisions based upon the
wishes of property-owning individuals who are family members.
However, the family has become a complex institution. Indeed, in
1990, "5.3 million married couple family households contained at
least one stepchild under age 18."429 This constituted 20.8% of all
married couple family households with children.43 ° Notwithstand-
ing these changes, intestacy laws for the most part appear to be
based upon a dated and incorrect assumption about family relation-
ships.
The fact is that the testamentary wishes of the majority of
stepfamily members are unknown. This phenomenon is likely
because no studies exist to indicate that stepfamilies have been
queried. However, even when strong evidence of a loving family
relationships exists, the blood relationship may be the sole consider-
ation under the intestacy statutes. 431 Steprelations are designated
beneficiaries in wills and even when the testator's intent to devise
gifts to the stepchildren is "clear to the layman," courts will often
find loopholes to deny the stepchildren any inheritance.432
During a time when many individuals do not live in nuclear
families,433 a shift away from fixed laws premised on the traditional
first marriage family would be a good solution. While recognition
of steprelations would require movement from the predictability
that inheritance through bloodlines provides, society needs to
develop and adopt an inheritance evaluation mechanism that
promotes greater fairness toward stepfamilies. By using biology to
427. Lovas, supra note 238, at 393.
428. See id.
429. Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 9.
430. See id.
431. See In re Estate of Berge, 47 N.W.2d 428, 429-31 (Minn. 1951); see also Suggestions
for Legal Reform, supra note 248, at 336 (analyzing In re Estate of Berge in the context of
stepfamily inheritance).
432. See generally In re Estate of Crossman, 377 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (stating
that a deceased's lack of action in an adoption cannot lead to a finding of "equitable
adoption," even if the deceased had an express intent to have his stepchildren inherit);
Defoeldvar v. Defoeldvar, 666 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that an equitable
adoption requires more than just a desire or an intent to adopt).
433. See Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 11.
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deny intestacy inheritance rights between stepfamily members, the
intestacy statutes ignore the reality of modern family life.
The laws that protected the traditional family in the past fail
to provide adequate protection to members of a stepfamily.434 The
existing protection is not adequate for the adult stepfamily partner
who relies on the financial marriage partnership. Neither is the
existing protection adequate for the stepchild who is dependent
upon the care and financial support of the stepparent.435 At the
present time, the best financial protection available to stepfamilies
is found through thoughtful and careful advance planning for the
stepfamily members. The consequences of a failure to plan can be
financially devastating.
4 36
IV. LAW AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE FINAN-
CIAL SECURITY OF WOMEN IN REMARRIAGES
Marriage is a civil and economic contract, but it is also viewed
as an emotional relationship and a financial partnership.437
However, such impressions can be misleading. "Partnership" is a
faulty description of marriage because nothing in an active
marriage assures financial equality between the husband and the
wife, and the courts do not always support a partnership theory at
divorce.438 Financial inequalities in a first marriage have been
generally documented and accepted by professionals.439 What has
not been done, to date, is a documentation of the degree of financial
inequality between husbands and wives in remarriages.
Anecdotal evidence and appellate cases indicate that remar-
riage financial inequalities are great if children are involved, and
many remarriages do include children. 4 0 Depending upon the
practices of the husband, the children of a woman in a second
marriage may be truly impoverished. This is especially true when
the children reach college age. 441 Remarried women may also
become impoverished after their spouses die because of social
434. See supra Part II.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 184-96.
436. See generolly Chambers v. Warren, 657 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
a deceased's intentions, as expressed by her will, were to be followed).
437. See DIVORCE DECISIONS WORKBOOK, supra note 269, at 35.
438. See CAROL ANN WILSON, THE FINANCIAL ADVISOR'S GUIDE TO DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
7 (1986).
439. See id. at 2-5.
440. See Glick, A Demographic Profile, supra note 10, at 24-26.
441. See Engel, College Expenses, supra note 111, at 5-8.
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practices and the laws of inheritance which are not designed to help
them.442
The assumption that the law provides for marital partnerships
is misguided. The divorce and inheritance cases discussed in Parts
II and III provide ample evidence that the idea of a legal partner-
ship is still a myth for most couples." 3 Of course, the laws on which
these cases are based could change. The biggest problem, though,
is that family law is traditionally controlled by states. Therefore,
an equitable judgment in one state will not be binding in another.
When entering a marriage, women generally face an extraordi-
nary financial disparity vis-&-vis their partners." A recent survey
of women's pre-existing financial conditions clearly indicates that
true marital equality does not generally exist at the outset of a
remarriage.445 A woman enters a second marriage with the same
social and financial constraints she encountered with her first
marriage, in addition to other constraints that are unique to a
second marriage.4 6 These inequalities are even more apparent
when women experience a second marriage dissolution-due to
divorce or the husband's death." v The United States' legal system
applies laws that favor wives and children from the original
marriage, 44 in spite of the fact that the situation for subsequent
spouses is generically more complicated. Thus, the inequalities
that may be hidden by a woman's remarriage become exposed when
that relationship ends.
A. Financial Myth and Financial Reality
Most commentators currently believe that marriage and family
income will solve the social problems of financially dependent
442. See STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAw, supra note 88, at 53-57, 179-81, 233-35 (1994).
443. See supra Parts II-III.
444. See generally Jan B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103
(1989) (describing the financial problems which women encounter in marriage).
445. See Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at Chapter 4: A Research Study
Examining the Financial [IniSecurity of Women in Remarriages.
446. Additional financial constraints include: ongoing expenses related to obtaining a
divorce, outgoing child and spousal support payments, the possibility that retirement income
has been divided by a mediated divorce agreement or by a court order, potential
encumbrances on life insurance policies if they are used as collateral for financial obligations
to prior family members, a division of assets in the divorce financial settlement, etc.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 277-305.
448. See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 6, at 716 (discussing the inadequacy of probate laws
when addressing the unique problems inherent in multiple marriages).
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women and children."9  It will not. Marriage is a temporary
solution, at best, because nothing in the typical marital scheme
supports the development and growth of a wife's personal and
independent financial security. A strong focus on "family" income
as an all-encompassing measurement technique creates a form of
adult female dependency and effectively denies and hides a wife's
financial reality.
The existence of children from a remarried husband's previous
marriage can also have a negative impact upon a remarried woman,
regardless of whether the husband has a custodial relationship with
his children.45 If the husband is a custodial father, women report
encountering a worsened financial position as compared to those
women whose husbands do not have custody.4 " Because a mother's
financial plight operates in tandem with that of her biological
children, it is likely that the addition of stepchildren to her family
will weaken a woman's personal financial security. This phenome-
non is unjust because women should not be penalized for having
children and accepting the care-taking responsibility for new ones.
Regardless of what a woman's husband might say about
treating his stepchildren and his biological children equally, he has
no legal obligation to do so.452 This legal position, however, does not
prevent some government agencies and public institutions from
assuming that "family" funds are readily available to all members
of the household.453 A primary example is the issue of college
tuition.45 Educational institutions typically assume a stepfather's
funds are available for use by his stepchildren and deny financial
aid on the basis of that assumption.455
If a stepfather chooses not to provide information or financial
help, the poverty imposed by an external entity against a child can
impact advancement opportunities for the rest of that child's life.
This second track of poverty, arising from being the progeny of a
remarried woman, occurs because the law does not mandate that
her children be treated equally with her husband's children.45 6
449. See STEPHANIE COONTz, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE 137 (1997) [hereinafter THE WAY
WE REALLY ARE].
450. See Lown & Dolan, supra note 2, at 76-77 (noting that remarried men are also
adversely affected when their wives bring children to the marriage).
451. See Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at Chapter 4.
452. see STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 10.
453. See Engel, College Expenses, supra note 111, at 6.
454. See id.
455. See FAFSA, supra note 109.
456. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1988).
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Equal financial treatment of stepchildren and biological children is
voluntary on the'stepfather's part.457 Moreover, the powerful legal
position of the remarried man makes it unlikely that he will
establish financial equality in a prenuptial agreement or in his
will.45 8 Consequently, his wife's children are automatically disad-
vantaged. This disadvantage provides another example of the
dysfunction of a presumption of "marital partnership."459 Existing
law firmly favors a man's children in a remarriage. Thus, the
children of remarried women are vulnerable to financial insecurity
unless properly executed documents are provided for them.
B. Policy Evolution
Remarriage has an ancient history. Families have continu-
ously reformed themselves after the death of a spouse,"' most likely
due to poor health, war, famine, pestilence, and childbirth.
However, remarriages are a different experience today. Most
remarriages follow divorce, not death.46 1 Moreover, remarriage
after divorce does not close the family circle and reconstitute the
former family. Instead, stepparents create new levels of kin and
new interaction patterns.462 Unfortunately, the financial issues
created by this familial evolution have been ignored.' As a result,
law and policy have lagged behind social change.
1. The State and Marriage Contracts
Typically, couples do not consider the ramifications that the
third party to their marriage contract-the state-has on their
union. State law builds a framework of benefits and responsibili-
ties that define the relationships between husbands and wives,
parents and children. In a country with a mobile populace but a
federally structured government, the lack of consistency from state
to state in family-related matters creates surprise and confusion.
Even a carefully planned marriage contract can be undercut if the
457. See supra Part II.G.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 260-305.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 251-59.
460. See STACEY, supra note 1, at 41.
461. See Clarke, supra note 11, at 4; RONI BERGER, STEPFAMILIES: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 12 (1998).
462. See Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of
the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 505, 533 (1998).
463. See generally DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST
URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995).
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couple moves to a state with a different set of marital benefits and
responsibilities.' Domicile is relevant, and a change may require
a renegotiation of financial presumptions.4"5 Most women do not
realize this inconsistency and need to be aware of ways to protect
their interests.
2. The Most Vulnerable Years
Within a remarriage, women's financial security slowly evolves
as stepfamily relationship issues are addressed and resolved.466
Between the fifth and tenth year of remarriage, the incidence of
joint asset ownership increases, as does the beneficiary status of
wives. 6 ' Additionally, spousal social security retirement benefits
are available after ten years of marriage. 6"
Unfortunately, statistics suggest that redivorce is most likely
to occur in the early, and most financially vulnerable years, of a
remarriage.' Existing divorce law reflects a societal presumption
that the wife can start again financially as a single woman or with
another marriage. 47' This possibility only truly exists for the young
ex-wife. The second wife, who is typically older, may not have
enough time to accumulate an adequate amount of her own
financial wealth and security if she has not begun that process
already.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Confusion about the role of women's financial security,
especially in second marriages, seems to permeate American
society, from our political institutions, to our legal codes, to the
actions and attitudes of individual family members. There appears
to be tremendous social and personal pressures on women that
464. See Michael K. Davis, Till Death Do Us Part: Antenuptial Agreements Concerning
Wills and Estates, 8 PROB. L.J. 301, 313-16 (1988) (describing the difficulties incongruous
statutory probate schemes create for couples signing an antenuptial agreement in state A
and subsequently moving to state B).
465. See DIVORCE DECISIONS WORKBOOK, supra note 269, at 15 (providing a discussion of
the states' positions characterized as equitable distribution, marital or community property,
or common law).
466. See Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at 170-75.
467. See id. at 170-73, 275-96.
468. See id, at 206.
469. See Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 6 (asserting that redivorce occurs sooner than
first divorce).
470. See WILSON, supra note 438, at 2-5.
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discourage them from articulating their own financial experiences
and opinions.
A preliminary tour of social science articles and legal opinions
suggests a disconnect between family law, policy, private ordering,
and the equitable allocation of assets in stepfamilies. The limited
research on stepfamily money management and the adjudication of
family financial conflicts begins to explain why the small imbal-
ances grow into large discriminatory effects. Thus, well-meaning
men and women unintentionally devalue the growth of a wife's
personal financial security through a series of small and not-so-
small slights.
Some sectors of society insist that the answer to most social
ills, including the financial insecurity of women, is the strengthen-
ing of the "traditional" nuclear family, with dad in the workplace as
the head of the family and mom in the home caring for the children
and submitting to her husband's authority.47' However, this
"solution" ignores the historical and sociological trends that have
produced the modern family diversity, as well as the modern
financial stance of women in marriage.472 It is not hard to imagine
that all kinds of families want the same things, a loving and
supportive adult relationship and happy, successful, and well-
adjusted children. However, by looking so longingly and lovingly at
the short-lived 50's model of a "perfect" family, society fails to
realize that many stepfamilies have opened the door to successful
family life in modern times.
These modern stepfamilies come in many permutations.
Stepfamilies include couples in which both the man and the woman
have been married before, or only the man or the woman has a prior
marital history. Both the husband and the wife may bring children
to the new marriage or only one member of the couple may be a
parent. Stepfamilies may include minor children, adult children,
or a combination of the two. The aforementioned stepfamily
combinations may be further complicated by differences in social,
racial, religious, or cultural environments.473
471. See generally BLANKENHORN, supra note 463 (describing how the changing roles of
fathers have negatively affected society).
472. See Tracy Longo, Alone Again, 10 FIN. PLAN. 130, 130 (1998) ("Eighty percent of
widows who now live in poverty were not considered poor when their husbands were alive.").
473. See Bartlett, supra note 82, at 912.
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A. Where Does Society Go Wrong?
Some deeply-held assumptions in the social structure, such as
"financial partnership" and "shared income," have emerged as
culprits which create havoc in the development of stable step-
families as they produce barriers to women's personal financial
security. Society should recognize that stepfamilies supplement the
great strengths of the traditional family while also rewriting the
script. It is therefore important that society normalizes family
variations, especially stepfamily variations.
B. A Five-Point Strategy
The following five-point strategy would maximize the value of
steprelationships. First, women in remarriages must realize that
acting for the common good of their marriage may not be the
equivalent of acting for their personal good. Second, couples must
obtain pre-remarriage counseling regarding the unique financial
issues related to their stepfamily. Third, the financial community
must reach out to the under-served population of women in
remarriages. Fourth, policies must be developed which play an
active role in promoting the welfare of stepfamily members. Fifth
and finally, laws and legal judgments on stepfamily matters must
be reviewed by an un-biased, interdisciplinary authority who is
empowered to hold the legal system accountable for its decisions.
1. Women in Step families
Predictable financial issues arise in stepfamilies without regard
to the length of the marriage, the extent of the finances, or the
stage in stepfamily development. For a married or remarried
woman to have financial support when she grows older, it is
necessary to master the facts of financial life in a stepfamily, along
with maintaining a comfortable and realistic set of attitudes to
guide her behavior.
Because marriage involves a financial relationship that is
based on personal affection, women typically do not exercise enough
caution, and consistently lose financial security when they fail to
negotiate an agreement that properly reflects the financial condi-
tions of their second marriage. Women routinely sacrifice opportu-
nities to increase their own wealth by. accepting the unpaid
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positions of caretaker or household manager.47 4 Women should
begin to document such decisions. In this way, they will be able to
account for their contributions in the event that the marriage ends.
In the meantime, women need to educate themselves about the laws
that affect them and voice their financial concerns with their
husbands so that they both can work toward solutions.
2. Couples in Stepfamilies
When couples are contemplating marriage, they should, at the
very least, have conversations about money management.475 These
conversations should address the following issues: whether or not
to have children together; moving away from the area in which they
live; quitting or starting a job; regular and irregular income sources;
income tax liability changes; current and pending liabilities
(child/spousal support, tax liabilities, pending lawsuits); ongoing
and future financial assistance to family members (children and
aging parents); money management styles (casual versus bean-
counting) on how to handle family finances (joint/separate accounts,
who pays which bills, etc.); insurance coverage (health, life,
property, umbrella); diagnosed health or emotional problems;
inheritance money; retirement security; and finally, health care
proxies and wills. If a couple talks seriously about these issues
before they enter into marriage, then perhaps women will be better
off in the end.
3. The Financial Community
It is imperative that society educates service providers about
the similarities and differences in family needs in first and
subsequent marriages. This essay suggests that women are
dissatisfied with the solutions and resources currently available to
them. Even when limited information is available, women say they
do not feel that the professionals understand their divorce and
remarriage experiences or how to help them prioritize their
needs.47 6 In short, women need both relevant financial information
and professionals who understand their financial reality.
474. See, e.g., THE WAYWE REALLYARE, supra note 449, at 80-81; see also COONTZ, supra
note 30 at 42-67 (discussing Individualism, Gender Myths, and the Problem of Love).
475. See MARGORIE ENGEL, WEDDINGS A FAMILY AFFAIR: THE NEW ETIQUETTE FOR
SECOND MARRIAGES AND COUPLES WITH DIVORCED PARENTS 149 (1998).
476. See Engel, Pockets of Poverty, supra note 31, at 220-25.
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The perception that professionals are uninformed about
remarriage issues provides a need for professionals to obtain
training about stepfamily financial dynamics as part of their
mandatory recertification process or through the development of
marketing and sales skills. Service providers to the remarriage
market need an overview of the stepfamily experience, as well as
detailed knowledge about how procedures within their specialty
field affect these families. This training should also include an
overview of the issues that are different from first families, along
with questions that remarried couples hesitate to bring up them-
selves.
A large number of women indicated that they would be more
likely to use an advisor from a company that has trained its sales
force in stepfamily dynamics and developed products designed for
remarried couples.477 For instance, a market exists for life insur-
ance providers who recognize the need for additional policies for
second, or higher order, families. Because these policies are
obtained at later ages and at less favorable premium rates than
those obtained in first marriages, insurance providers will have
incentives to sell these policies. Other types of insurance may also
offer solutions to stepfamily problems. Among these other types of
insurance include: life insurance policies as a "back up" to inheri-
tance security; divorce insurance policies; arrangements for
continued medical coverage of children of divorce/remarriage in the
event of death, disability, or the change of employment of the
legally responsible parent; and a child support payment assurance
banking program, including interim payments when a parent is in
noncompliance with a divorce agreement.
The financial industry also needs to provide clear explanations
for investment products in a non-accusatory manner. Women
desperately want financial facts, but even basic subjects can be
touchy when speaking with remarried men and women. It is
important for professionals to gingerly approach financial fault-
lines in remarriages, rather than avoiding them altogether. The
financial equality, stepchild support, and beneficiary status issues
are some of the very areas in which women need help. However, it
is not enough to simply reach a woman on the verge of remarriage
or as a newlywed. She requires the independent capacity to insist
upon having her own financial counselors involved in the develop-
ment of a marital partnership plan. A woman's counselor must be
477. See id. at 219.
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prepared with the correct documentation to support her position
and to develop a product that is specific to her financial needs.
The financial and legal communities are also remiss for not
championing marriage contracts that support both equality and the
renewal of those contracts. Lawyers and financial advisors can
heighten the awareness of women, and reduce their financial
insecurity, by providing a professional forum for developing marital
partnership contracts without divisive discussions about money.
For instance, this process could point out how women's money is
often dissipated by family consumables (food, clothing, home and
yard care, family gifts, etc.) while men's money is put toward
tangible assets (mortgage, stocks, retirement plans, etc.). 478
Perhaps it should be common practice for compensation and
retirement benefits to accrue to both the husband and the wife from
the household pool of income.
In order to provide services to stepfamilies, financial companies
are dealing with a marketing strategy that is both "push" and
"pull." For some women, they should use "push" in order to create
awareness and demand development. For others, they are in a
"pull" situation whereby they can simply take orders for a pre-
recognized need. Thus, each company's primary job is to distin-
guish their products and services from their competitors. It is
possible that the creativity of the marketplace will result in new
products and the training of financial professionals so that hus-
bands and wives are both in a position to make more equitable
financial choices in their personal family money management.
A market solution pilot program could be based upon: policy
issues; recognition in schools; preventive measures when couples
obtain their marriage license at city hall;471 professional counseling
about money; and targeted financial products. Continuing financial
education programs could also include: course development for
girls' and women's financial studies; Life Planning prenuptial
financial counseling "valuing" all forms of family contributions
made by the husband and wife so that equity may be appropriately
478. When the outcome of the husband's money is visible and the outcome of the wife's
money is not, the stage is set for money hassles at the time of divorce or drafting of
inheritance documents. See Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the
Management and Control Provisions of Community Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 253
(1994-95).
479. In addition to the typical requirement such as blood tests, states could require
couples to submit to financial equity reviews. Such a requirement would encourage people
to begin their marriages as financial partners. o-Furthermore, the federal or state
governments could urge couples to review their respective financial standing each year at
tax time and to reestablish parity when necessary.
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apportioned; and retirement planning programs for remarried
couples to take into consideration accumulated funds diminished by
QDRO's [Qualified Domestic Relations Orders] that divide these
assets in a divorce agreement.
Regardless, service providers in the financial industry need a
clear understanding that, through no fault of their own, bad
financial events can happen to women due to society's marriage
customs and court decisions. These service providers need to tailor
their services accordingly.
4. Our Government and Policy-Makers
A definite need for more information about families and money
management exists, but America is going in the wrong direction.
Closing the government offices that collect and tabulate data on
divorce and marriage, including remarriage, is short-sighted.48 ° The
government is limiting the availability of reliable data at a time
when such data is critical for the development of appropriate
financial policies for stepfamilies. Society needs statistical data
that is independent and more comprehensive than data collected by
insurance companies and academic researchers. One simple way
to gain important information about stepfamilies is to ask questions
about the age and sex of children from prior unions on marriage
license forms. This questioning will give researchers and
policymakers access to more accurate information about the types
of stepfamilies being formed, as well as information about the
number of children living in remarriage households.
Financial issues within a family have been traditionally seen
as private matters.48 ' However, because society is negatively
affected by the consequences of financial divorce agreements
breaking down, society pays the price when parents are unable to
meet the financial needs of their children.482 Society targets other
family social issues, such as drug abuse and spousal abuse, with
commissions and research funding but the enormous and growing
social issue of stepfamily finances is being neglected. 483 Groups are
480. See generally Clarke, supra note 11 (stating that the system whereby the federal
government obtains information about marriages and divorces is being discontinued due to
budget cuts. The Branch does not know what will become of raw data collected between 1991
and 1995 due to the ongoing downsizing of staff.).
481. See generally supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between women's finances and the private, domestic sphere).
482. See Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage 'For the Sake of the Children"." A Feminist
Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1435, 1452 (1992) (citation omitted).
483. See Lown & Dolan, supra note 2, at 80.
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needed to finance research in the areas of stepfamily realities: the
effect of child support payments and how they are made; the ways
that college financial aid policies undermine stepfamilies; and the
dual rubric requiring no legal financial responsibility for step-
children, but counting the stepparent's funds as if there were such
a requirement.
The federal government should address inconsistencies within
and between its branches. At the core, the United States needs a
uniform and consistent definition of "family" and "family members"
which includes stepfamily relationships-a definition of "family"
that supersedes all prior interpretations in law, policy, or prece-
dent.
Inconsistencies between state and federal policies must also be
resolved. These differences arise in the course of on-going mar-
riages when federal policies presume that stepparent income is
available for stepchild support.4 This phenomenon is especially
true in situations of the stepchild's need for financial aid for college
expenses,4 since the stepchildren are eligible for lower or no
benefits because of a stepparent's income, even though the state
places no legal financial obligation on the stepparent. This
maneuver preserves federal funds, leaves the stepchild dependent
upon the voluntary contributions of stepparents, and does much to
create household friction.4
8 6
Stepfamily relationships are legally recognized, primarily when
it is financially advantageous to the public coffers to do SO. 4 87 As a
result of these mixed messages, court cases are a hodgepodge of
individual rulings without consistent guidance to other litigious and
non-litigious stepfamilies.4"' Most family law and policy points to
the stepchild as the marginal child in spite of the "best interests of
the child" rhetoric.489 These referenced court battles pertaining to
the responsibility for children support the notion that the lack of
clear obligations, rights, and privileges between stepparents and
484. See supra text accompanying notes 101-112.
485. The starting point is a federal form requiring financial information from the
residential stepparent. The stepparent's financial position is used in calculating monies
assumed to be available to the college student. Using the "no legal financial responsibility
for stepchild" determination, a stepparent can refuse to provide the information-and the
application will not be processed. If a stepparent refuses to provide funds, the student is
simply out of luck. See Engel, College Expenses, supra note 111, at 6.
486. See id. at 8.
487. See supra notes 113-75 and accompanying text.
488. See id.
489. Cf Mason & Simon, supra note 102, at 452 (discussing different treatment of children
under federal law).
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stepchildren lessens the degree of commitment to family members
and to the second marriage.49 °
When referring to family finances, problematic generalities
exist. The consistent use, in government, financial, and research
reports, of family income levels as a measure of a wife's financial
security is misleading and erroneous. The concept of family income
being truly available to all family members is not supported by the
court cases described in this essay.49 In spite of significant
evidence to the contrary, the "official word" remains an all-inclusive
family income as a measure of a wife's financial security.492
Along the same lines as the family income issue, some court
cases revolving around stepfamilies and money point to gender
neutral language in laws and policies, as if this language assures
gender neutral outcomes.493 In reality, however, the gender neutral
language in laws and policies does nothing to assure gender neutral
outcomes. 4" Indeed, the case may be made that the language often
legally supports the opposite outcome.
5. Our Legal System
Litigation has its limits as a policy-making tool, especially
when the law is not reflective of the reality of stepfamily life. The
popular presumption of "financial partnership" masks financial
inequality in remarriages.495 Courts need to become less passive
and more sophisticated with respect to the value of a woman's
contribution to the family. For instance, in one Connecticut case,
the judge ruled that Lorna Wendt had a valid claim to significant
portions of her husband's employment compensation, investments,
and family assets by virtue of her nonmonetary contributions to
their marriage.496
490. See supra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
491. See, e.g., Mears v. Mears, 213 N.W.2d 511, 511 (Iowa 1973) (discussing the limits of
a stepparent's duty to support stepchildren); Gregory v. Estate of Gregory, 866 S.W.2d 379
(Ark. 1993) (discussing the superiority of children's rights over the surviving spouse's rights
in a will contract dispute).
492. See supra Part IV.A.
493. See Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 19 (1991).
494. Cf Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA96-0149562-5, 1998 WL 161165, at *85 (Conn. Super.
Mar. 31, 1998) (stating that nonmonetary contribution criteria using "gender favorable"
language violates the state's Equal Rights Amendment and that such criteria should apply
to wage earners and non-wage earners alike).
495. See supra text accompanying notes 205-37, 379-99.
496. See Wendt, No. FA96-0149562-5, 1998 WL 161165, at *42, *228-29 (holding that
nonmonetary contributions of both spouses must be considered in asset disposition following
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One way to avoid expanding this gap between the law and the
reality of stepfamily life would be to mandate a determination of
assets and debts at the outset of the marriage. At the present time,
no state demands a prenuptial agreement.497 Unfortunately,
prenuptial agreements tend to have negative connotations. Many
people view them as a means to limit, rather than to enable, access
to asset ownership.49 s Despite their tainted image, prenuptial
agreements could provide an excellent vehicle for women to
establish the value of their contributions to the household at the
outset of their marriage and to ensure their financial protection at
the dissolution of their marriage. Another option could entail
having laws patterned after affirmative action legislation, designed
to reinforce appropriate financial behavior in marriage. At present,
society represents marriage as a partnership,4 99 but nothing
protects women who believe that is an accurate representation.
Stepparent adoption policies also need to be based on the
realities of stepfamilies. It is generally recognized that the lack of
legal ties lessens the commitment to children. 00 The lack of
balance between the interests of the stepchild versus the adopted
child is a case in point. Under traditional adoption procedures,
adoption severs the adopted child's connection to the biological
parents for social and legal purposes.5 ' However, in stepfamilies,
most stepchildren continue to have at least some limited connection
with the non-custodial parent, as well as relatives on that parent's
side of the family.
Though the state recognizes that no practical purpose exists for
severing the connection to the biological parent, however tenuous
it may be, it has put unnecessary legal barriers into place for
stepparent adoption.0 2 A new form of adoption would untangle the
quagmire of obligations, rights, and privileges between stepparent
and stepchild. This new type of adoption could occur automatically
upon marriage to the child's biological parent but would not create
divorce, even though the wife's contributions in this case did not even entitle her to a fifty-
fifty split of the assets).
497. See generally Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomies of Drafting
Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 147, 205 (1996) (advocating that states
require prenuptial agreements prior to marriage).
498. See generally Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 84, 144 n.200 (1994) thereinafter Disinheritance] (discussing the foreboding
image of prenuptial agreements).
499. See Waggoner, supra note 6, at 716.
500. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
501. See STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW, supra note 88, at 163.
502. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 360-64 for a discussion of barriers to
adoption.
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a loss of the other biological parent's rights, obligations, or inheri-
tance eligibility. It would legitimize the stepparent/stepchild
relationship, recognize that biology is not the sole determining
factor of whether someone is a parent, and publicly acknowledge an
important source of care-taking and support for the child.
The law of wills embodies a general assumption that testators
do not regard stepfamily members as family members-another
legal impediment to stepfamily equality. The states' unwillingness
to include stepfamily members in class gifts to the testator's
relatives disadvantages stepchildren. Unless the statutes in
question specifically provide a preferred classification for
stepchildren-most do not-they are strangers to the blood
relatives and are subject to the higher inheritance tax rates.
The recent revisions in the UPC were designed to bring the law
in line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic
partnership.5 3 The economic partnership, however, exists in
language only-with this matter, no laws with teeth exist.5' As a
result, if a man refuses to make a will and instead relies upon the
new intestacy laws, he can severely limit his wife's financial
beneficiary status. An interim step, on the way to a true marital
partnership and financial equality between spouses, would be to
abandon the "forced share" concept and work on the basis of
"community property."
C. The Future
It is vital that we approach the financial insecurity of women
in remarriages specifically and concisely, not as a secondary issue.
Without having the family laws relating to how people live and who
cares for them, American laws and policies are simply a statement
of the types of behaviors that lawmakers do and do not endorse.
When a legal system that supposedly exists to redress harm refuses
to recognize many of the financial difficulties that women suffer, it
appears to be a legal system for sustaining patriarchy. While the
most egregious abuses have been eradicated from the books, a
horrible legacy remains in our laws and policies, even though the
actual words are not present.50 5 Egalitarian values for women are
not yet reflected in the laws or policies for stepfamilies.
503. See Whitebread, supra note 327, at 125.
504. See id. at 139.
505. See CATHARINEA. MAcKINNON, TOWARDA FEMINISTTHEORYOFTHE STATE 234 (1989).
In order to "fix" existing problems, we need further research to
determine which laws and policies promote wives' financial security
and which ones create barriers. We need a professional, interdisci-
plinary forum to address ways to promote a new understanding of
the problem and to achieve policy initiatives in the midst of
traditional and moral arguments. How the debate is framed and
what options are put before the public will define the breadth of our
country's support for true marital partnerships.
This groundwork has opened the way for more detailed studies
in a number of financial areas. For instance, society needs to
examine the importance of "types" of money-operating expenses
and capital formation-regardless of income source-as well as the
ramifications of the asset mix when providing liquidity or lack of
liquidity. In the family finance scheme, society needs to ask
whether the second wife's money is dismissed because expense
items-groceries, children's clothing, family gifts-do not hold the
same financial value as her husband's purchase of stocks and
retirement benefits. 5 6 We also need to question how stepfamilies
arrange their long-range financial planning, including inheritance.
This information is relevant for updating intestacy laws that impact
a large proportion of the American population. Moreover, society
should examine the financial, legal, and social impact of the
existing laws and policies on a sample population of stepchildren.
A closer look at the financial impact mothers encounter while courts
continue to debate when and if fathers and stepfathers have a
financial responsibility to their children is necessary. Expanded
studies about how stepfamilies actually manage their money would
be invaluable in making more detailed proposals for the develop-
ment of laws, policies, and financial products.
A permanent vehicle to make serious headway on the interdis-
ciplinary project of shoring up American families is clearly needed.
This vehicle requires credibility and visibility and I recommend the
creation of The Permanent Commission on the Status of the Family.
This Commission should determine, in a comprehensive way, how
the divorce and remarriage process could be made less destructive
for the women and children who live in divorced, single-parent, or
step families. The fundamental solutions to fragile stepfamilies lie
in the reform of the ground rules for marriage and for the responsi-
bility for children. Because neither culture, nor structure, are
506. This is an extension of the basic dilemma about how to value a woman's
contribution-a contribution usually thought of as "unpaid work" and used here to include
actual monetary contributions.
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necessarily immutable, the Permanent Commission on the Status
of the Family should also be charged with recommendations to the
legal and judicial systems with new ideas and new approaches to
restore the integrity of the divorce and remarriage process.
It is clear that we do not live in a world where the majority of
people are compelled to stay married "until death do us part."50 7
Some couples are not willing to go through the hard work of
renegotiating traditional gender roles and expectations. Some
individuals choose personal autonomy over family commitments.
Some marriages fail for other reasons, such as abuse, personal
betrayals, or chronic conflict; and often it is in no one's interest that
such marriages be saved. My proposals are additional cogs in the
wheel to "institutionalize" divorce and remarriage by surrounding
them with clear obligations and rights, supported by law, customs,
and social expectations. If society eradicates the idea that every
divorce and remarriage case is a new contest in which no accepted
ground rules exist, we will minimize the temptation for parents to
use divorce and remarriage to escape obligations to each other and
to their children.
The goal is to "make the invisible visible" and, by so doing,
encourage the public and private policy changes that are needed to
better apportion stepfamily resources. This piece of research is a
beginning for looking at the economic consequences of existing laws
and policies, not in order to help women in remarriages to adapt
individually to the status quo, but to criticize, and ultimately
change it, via market, government, and society.
D. Role for the Stepfamily Association of America
Stepfamilies are a primary family form in the United States,
and yet they have no effective lobbying group to represent their
interests. People in stepfamilies should begin to think of them-
selves as a class because the problems they face are public prob-
lems, not solely individual problems. The same socially patterned
issues repeatedly come up and yet, in spite of the numbers of
stepfamilies and the awareness of problems, there remains isolating
behavior.
This essay proposes and defends the financial reality that social
structural reasons exist as to why some women are at odds with
men and some stepparents are at odds with stepchildren: namely
the marriage-based inequitable distribution of resources within
507. See Norton & Miller, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing recent trends in divorce).
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many stepfamilies. Financial plans that are made on both the
foundation of inconsistent legal rulings and the financial support
that is made at the discretion of the wealthier spouse are not built
on a firm foundation. The entire plan is subject to destruction on
a whim. Many women find that their financial imbalance nega-
tively affects their feelings about both their spouse and their
marriage. This essay suggests that these interrelationships are not
examined because they are often uncomfortable for a particular
group of people. Addressing these stepfamily realities is a logical
objective for the Stepfamily Association of America. °8
The board of the Stepfamily Association of America recently
approved an expanded purpose and vision in order to provide
information, support, and advocacy for stepfamilies and those who
work with them.50 9 The Association's purpose is to develop and
disseminate research-based information and materials; design,
implement, and evaluate opportunities for support and education;
evaluate and recommend programs, materials, and standards of
practice; and advocate for financial, institutional, political, and
social changes that support stepfamilies.51 Society cannot and
should not rest until it reaches the Stepfamily Association of
America's vision that stepfamilies become accepted, supported, and
successful.5 '
508. See Kay Pasley, Divorce and Remarriage in Later Adulthood, 18 STEPFAMILIES 1, 3
(Spring 1998).
509. Telephone Interview with Claudia Dougherty, General Staff member for the
Stepfamily Association of America (March 15, 1999).
510. See id.
511. See id.
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